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1. SU}~~RY: The FCC seeks review of a decision ovcrtur~ing 
its order defining, and prohibiting the broadcast of, "indecent 
"""-'"' "'-"' ......... ~' .. 
language." 
::wa-r--
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: At about 2:00p.m. on 
October 20, 1973, radio station WBAI in New York City, which 
is licensed to resp, broadcast a pre-recorded monologue by 
( . comedian George Carlin entitled "Filthy Words." The monologue, 
r ~o&4tJ de~y t/t.is pefftialt ' $eat lasf paoe. 
~ 
2. 
~/ a transcript of which is printed in Pet.App. 58-62, is built 
around the seven words that in Mr. Carlin's view cannot be 
I 
1/ 
used over the air or in polite society.- On December 3, 1973 
the FCC received a complaint about the airing of this monologue 
from a man who was riding in a car with his young son when it 
was playedo 
The FCC forwarded the complaint to WBAI with a request for 
comments. The station responded that the monologue had been 
played as part of a program dealing with "contemporary society's 
attitudes toward language" and that listeners had been advised 
before the monologue was played that it contained language that 
might be offensive to some. The FCC then instituted a proceeding 
to determine whether the language broadcast was "obscene, 
indecent, or profane" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1464. If 
it was, the FCC is empowered to revoke the station's license, 
impose a monetary forfeiture, or issue a cease and desist order. 
47 u.s.c. §§312(a), 312(b), 503(b)(l)(E). 
At the conclusion of its proceeding, the FCC issued what 
it labeled a "declaratory order" in which it defined "indecent 
language" for purposes of §1464. "Indecent language," the 
Commission said, is "language that describes, in terms patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards.for 
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, 
at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children 
1. Carlin lists "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, 




may be in the audience." /The Corrnnission said such language 
is distinct from "obscene language in that (1) it lacks the 
element of appeal to the prurient interest, •.• and that 
3. 
(2) when children may be in the audience, it cannot be redeemed 
by a claUn that it has literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value." Pet.App. 71. The Commission left open 
the possibility that,-
'\fuen the number of children in the audience is reduced 
to a minimum, for example during the late evening hours, 
a different . standard might conceivably be used. The 
definition of indecent would remain the same •..• However, 
we would also consider whether the material has serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value .•.. " 
Pet.App. 71. 
In stating this definition, the Commission asserted that 
"the broadcast medium is not subject to the same analysis that 
might be appropriate for other, less intrusive forms of 
expression" for four reasons: "(1) children have access to 
radios and in many cases are unsupervised by parents; (2) radio 
receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy 
interest is entitled to extra deference, ... (3) unconsenting 
adults may tune in a station without any warning that offensive 
language is being or will be broadcast; and (4) there is a 
scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must 
therefore license in the public interest." Pet.App. 69. The 
Commission said that its first reason was of greatest concern 
to it, and that its definition was intended to channel offensive 
language away from time slots when children might hear it. Id. 69-70. 
4. 
Applying its definition of "indecent language" to the 
case before it, the Commission held that Carlin's seven words 
all were indecent "as broadcast." Pet.App. 72. Rather than 
imposing sanctions on the station, however, the Commission said 
it was issuing a "declaratory order ... to clarify the standard 
which the Commission utilizes to judge 'indecent language.' " 
Id., at 73. The Commission did state that the order would be 
"associated with the station's license file" for reference irt 
the event future complaintswere filed against the station. 
Commissioner Reid filed a concurring statement in which 
she said the Commission's "standards do not go far enough" 
because the language at issue is "totally inappropriate for 
broadcast at any time." Pet.App. 79. Commissioner QUello filed 
a concurring statement expressing the same sentiment: "Garbage 
is garbage." Pet.App. 80. Commissioner Robinson, joined by 
5"""""11:. ....... 
Commissioner Hooks, filed a concurring statement in which he 
defended the majority's approach despite some First Amendment 
doubts. Pet.App. 81-92. 
Following issuance of the Commission's order, the Radio 
Television News Directors Association filed a motion for 
clarification or reconsideration seeking a ruling that the 
Commission "does not intend to apply its definition of indecent 
language so as to prohibit the broadcasting of indecent words 
which might otherwise be reported as a part of a bona fide 
news or public affairs program." Pet.App. 94. The Association 
s. 
pointed out that "in some cases, public events likely to produce 
offensive speech are covered live, and there is no opportunity 
for journalistic editing." Id., at 95 n.l. The Commission 
responded that it had not absolutely prohibited the broadcast 
of indecent language, but only sought to "channel" it to hours 
when children were unlikely to be listening; that it probably 
would be inequitable to hold a licensee responsible for indecent 
language used during a live broadcast of a news event; and that 
it would not comment on any other hypothetical situations posed 
~y the Association. 
The D.C. Cir. reversed the Commission's order. Judge Tamm 
thought, first, that the order collided with 47 U.S.C. §326, which 
states that "no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or 
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of 
free speech by means of radio communication." In his view, the 
defect in the order's definition of "indecent language" was that 
it did not take into account whether a "broadcast containing 
such words may have serious artistic, literary, political or 
scientific value ••. "In particular, it would ban the broadcast 
"of many great works of literature including Shakespearian plays ,_, ,_. 
~ .............. .... .._. ...--. ...... 
and contemporary plays which have won critical acclaim, the 
works of renowned classical and contemporary poets and writers, 
2/ 
and passages from the Bible." - This censorship was bey·ond the 
Commission's power as restricted by §326. 
2. Later in the opinion he cites as examples Shakespeare's 
The Tempest and the "works of Auden, Becket, Lord Byron, Chaucer, 
Fielding, Greene, He ngway, ce, Knowles, Lawrence, Onvell, . 




Given this conclusion, Judge Tamm thought it unnecessary to 
decide whether the term "indecent" in §1464 could be defined to 
include matter that was not "obscene." Even if the Commission 
had the power, in the face of the First Amendment, to prohibit 
the broadcast of speech that is not constitutionally obscene, 
"the statute or order instituting such a ban must not be overbroad 
of!ovague." This order suffered from both defects. It was overbroad 
because it banned the broadcast of works of serious value, and it 
was vague because it did not define what age children the 
Commission thought it was necessary to protect. Pet.App. 13-15. 
Chief Judge Bazelon filed a concurring opinion. He thought 
the Commission's definition of "indecent language" was "massively 
overbroad" under the First Amendment as interpreted in Miller v. 
California, 414 U.S. 81 (1973). First, indecency was to be 
tested under "contemporary community standards for the broadcast 
medium" rather than under "local community standards." Second, 
appeal to the prurient interest was no~o be 
a work was not to be judged as a whole. And 
could not be redeemed by serious value. 
considered. Third, 
finally, a work 
Judge Bazelon then considered and rejected the Commission's 
arguments that speech protected in other media might constitutionally 
be prohibited in the broadcast media. The argument that broadcasts 
intrude on privacy interests, especially in the home, fell mainly 
because a listener can escape by turning off the radio. The 
argument that regulation of indecent language was necessary to 
protect children fell for a number of reasons. Conceding that 
(_; 
7. 
the Commission might have greater power to regulate speech aimed 
at children than at adults, Judge Bazelon thought the order was 
objectionable because it reduced the listening fare of adults 
with normal sleeping habits to that fit only for children. The 
Commission should have made a greater effort to protect the 
adults' rights, and should have erred i.n the direction of under-
regulation. Moreover, the Commission's order rested on the 
unproven premises that most parents do not want their childrentf~ 
to hear any indecent language and that most parents are unable~ 
to control their children's radio listening habits. And the ~ 
~s~ ~hat::::the Co~ission ~ the power to =;revent chi
from hearing non-obscene language because of the parents' wishes 
was inherently boundless, justifying censorship of anything else 
parents might not want their children to hear. Finally, the. 
Commission's order was not justifiable on the ground that broadcast 
channels are scarce, for §326 reflects a Congres.sional judgment agains t 
content regulation on this ground. 
Judge Leventhal dissented, emphasizing that despite the 
generality of the Commission's standard, it had only decided 
that the monologue broadcast by resp was indecent "as broadcast" 
at 2 p.m. in the afternoon. Taking issue with Judge Bazelon, 
Judge Leventhal thought that the Commission's definition of 
"indecent langauge" reflected the same underlying considerations 
as this Court's definition of "obsce~y" in Miller. In particular, 
Miller had expanded "obscenity" to include "patently offensive 
-,. representations of • . • • excretory functions," which was the only 
8. 
kind of non-prurient material covered by the Commission's 
definition. In any event, the fact that radio intrudes into 
the home, and its easy accessibility to children, warrant the 
Commission's special sensitivity to the problem at hand. If 
the order is overbroad because it bans "indecent" speech that 
has serious value and is broadcast in evening hours when children 
are likely to be under parental control, the court should wait 
for a case presenting that set of facts to so hold. 
D.C. Cir. denied rehearing ~ bane, Judges Leventhal, 
MacKinnon, Robb, and Wilkey dissenting. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The FCC contends that cert should be granted 
in order to decide whether the unique qualities of the broadcast 
media justify its definition and proscription of "indecent" 
language. It relies especially upon expresiions of this Court 
suggesting that broadcast media present special First Amendment 
problems; upon the need to protect children from language of the -
kind covered by its order; and upon the need to preserve to parents 
the decision whether their children will hear such language. 
The Commission also points to the wide divergence of views on D.C. 
Cir., and it contend~ that Jud~ Leventhal's narrow focus on the - - -- - -------
case at hand was more appropriate than the majority's "overbreadth" 
approach. Finally, it contends that the problem is ripe for 
review because it has been receiving increasing numbers of complains 
complaints in recent years and has been grappling with the problem 
for some time. 
9. 
Resp replies that cert should be denied because the narrow 
holding below - that the Commission's order is overbroad under 
§326 - clearly is correct. In particular, the order bans the 
use of non-obscene words without regard to their context. In 
addition, no important issue of federal law is presented, as 
. 
is demonstrated by the Justice Department's decision not to 
support the Commission's petition for cert. The D.C. Cir. did 
not decide whether non-obscene speech ever could be banned on 
the broadcast media, but rather held that assuming it can, the 
order was overbroad. And the court did not even reach the 
question whether this particular monologue was "indecent" within 
the meaning of §1464. 
4. DISCUSSION: Because of the legislative nature of the 
Commission's order and the divergence of views on D.C. Cir., 
this case comes here in rather an unfocused state. Judge Tamm 
thought the order was overbroad under §326, Judge Bazelon 
thought it was overbroad under the First Amendment, and Judge 
Leventhal thought the order was permissible at least as applied: 
But even he may be ready to concede that the order is invalid 
in other situations. 
Although this is an area into which the Court has not 
ventured before, it seems likely that the Commission's approach, 
with its focus on words,rather than on words and context, 
was not sufficiently discerning even taking into account the 
special problems of the broadcast media. The Commission made 
l 
it quite clear that a broadcast's claim to serious merit 
would make no difference in determining whether it was 
"indecent" except, perhaps, if the broadcast were late at 
night. As Judge Tamm pointed out, this would keep a fair 
number of serious works off the air at times when most 
adults could listen. Even granting validity to the 
Commission's "channeling" approach, one would think that it 
might have taken into account both the adults' interest in 
access to such works, and the possibility that children 
could be shielded from them. 
The question of airing Carlin's monologue at 2 p.m. 
presents a more difficult question, but it no longer is at 
the center of this codTroversy. The Commission decided 
not to impose sanctions for the broadcast, and both judges 
Given the in the majority effectively ignored the issue. 
-----------------~--~-----~-------------breadth of the declaratory portion of the Commission's 
order, and its potential chilling effect on broadcasters, 
the majority's overbreadth approach seems more appropr~ate 
than the dissenter's as-applied approach. Thus, unless the : ' 
Court is incli ned to review the majority i s overbreadth 
holding, the case probably is not worth taking. 
There is a response. 
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No. 77-528, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
A. The Order Under Review. The facts and decisions below a~e 
stated adequately in the Preliminary Memo, which I wrote. To 
recap briefly, 18 u.s.c. § 1464 prohibits the broadcast of "obscene, 
indecent, or profane language." In the course of considering a 
listener complaint about respondent's broadcast of a George Carlin 
monologue, the FCC issued what it labeled a "Declaratory Order" 
in which it defined "indecent" language as follows: 
" '[I]ndecent ••• language •.. describes, in terms 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community 
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory 
activities and organs, at times of the day when there is 
a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." 
App. 15. The FCC explicitly distinguished the "indecent" from 
the "obscene": 
"[I]ndecent language is distinguished from obscene language 
in that (1) it lacks the element of appeal to the prurient 
interest, • • . and that (2) when children may be in the 
audience, it cannot be redeemed by a claim that it has 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value." 
Ibid. The FCC hinted, although it did not hold, that "indecent" 
language might be broadcast! 
"[w]hen the number of children in the audience is reduced 
to a minimum, for example during the late evening hours . • • 
[if] the material has serious literary, artistic, political 
or scientific value •.• [and if the broadcaster makes] 
substantial and solid efforts to warn unconsenting adults 
who do not want the type of language in this case thrust 
into the sanctuary of their home." Id., at 15-16. 
The FCC listed four reasons why material that is not 
constitutionally obscene might be censored when broadcast: 
"(1) children have access to radios and in many cases are 
unsupervised by parents; (2) radio receivers are in the 
home, a place where people's privacy is entitled to extra 
deference, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970); 
(3) unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any , 
warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcist; 
and (4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of 
which the government must therefore license in the public 
interest." Id., at 13. 
The FCC analogized "indecent" language to a "public nuisance," 
and said that its aim was to "channel" such language into time 
slots when children would be unlikely to hear it.Id., at 14. 
as 
The FCC concluded with a statement that "the langua,.e/broadcast 
was indecent and prohibited by 18 u.s.c. 1464." Id., at 17. It did 
not, however, impose any sanctions, stating: 
"There are several reasons why we are issuing a declaratory 
order instead of a notice of apparent liability • • • A 
declaratory order is a flexible procedural device admirably 
suited to terminate the present controversy between a 
listener and the station, and to clarify the standards 
which the Commission utilizes to judge 'indecent language.' 
[cites] Such an order will permit all persons who consider 
themselves aggrieved or who wish to call additional factors 
to the Commission's attention to seek reconsideration. [cite] 
If not satisfied by the Commission's action on reconsideration, 
judicial review may be sought immediately." Ibid. 
B. ~~e is! ue that divides the parties is _whether 
the statutory and constitutional validity of the Order should 
be considered on its face, or as applied. The two judges in 
the majority below took the former view, while the dissenter took 
the latter. For the reasons stated in Part~ infra, I would 
consider the Order on its face. Even if it is considered as applied, 
however, its validity is not free from doubt. 
@ The second iss~ is whether the term "indecent" in Section 
1464 can be construed to mean anything other than what is 
constitutionally obscene. For the reasons stated in PartlX% infra, 
I conclude that it can. 
~e ~ird is ~ue is whether the FCC's construction of § 146~'~ 
proscription of "indecent" language, either on its face or as 
applied, violates the First Amendment rights of broadcasters or 
listeners. For the reasons stated in Part I V infra, I would 
conclude that, although the FCC may ban the use of some "indecent" 
language that is not constitutionally obscene, it has taken too 
indiscriminate an approach to the problem. 
II. HOW TO VIEW THE ORDER. 
Perhaps the fundamental point that divided Judges Tamm and 
Bazelon from Judge Leventhal was whether the validity of the 
Order should be judged by the general rules that it purports to 
declare, or by the application of those rules to the specific 
1/ 
complaint that was before the FCC.- Likewise, in this Court 
Pacifica and the SG argue that the Order should be judged by 
its general rules, while the FCC urges that it should be judged as 
applied. 
Although I have a great deal of respect for Judge Leventhal, 
I disagree with him on this issue. My reasons are these: 
1. The express intent of the Order is to lay down general 
rules that will govern broadcasters' conduct in the future. 
Although the FCC did not follow the formal procedures for agency 
rulemaking, it invited all interested parties to submit their 
comments in the form of petitions for reconsideration and to seek 
immediate judicial review of the Order. In addition, when this 
case was on review before the CADC panel, the FCC apparently did 
!!£!argue that its Order should be considered "as applied." See 
Brief for Pacifica at 19 n. 16. Finally, even though the FCC now 
argues that the Order should be considered as applied, it also 
admits its intent "to issue a declaratory order that would guide 
the public and broadcast licensees." Brief for FCC at 44; accord, 
Reply Brief for FCC at 5-6. In this situation, it strikes me as 
highly unrealistic to say that all the FCC did was decide one 
1. Even Judge . Leventhal· expressed do~bts as to the general rules 
that the FCC announced. See App. 104-106. In particular, he 
doubted the validity of the rules as they might be applied to 
p,rgadnas~s in the rarly evening, and the inclusion of the word 
t1ts 1n the FCC s l1st of prohibited words. 
particular case - especially in view of the fact that it did not 
even apply any sanctions in that particular case. 
2. If the new general rules sweep too broadly - as even 
Judge Leventhal thought they may, see note 1, supra - they will 
function to deter constitutionally protected speech. I believe 
that Judge Leventhal did not give this consideration sufficient 
weight. Although I realize that you are no great fan of overbreadth 
analysis, I would urge that, at least in the first instance, you 
consider whether the rules are "substantially overbroad," and hence 
subject to facial invalidation. See Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 216-217 (1975). I feel rather strongly that if the rules 
go too far, the broadcasters of the nation should not have to live 
with the cloud of FCC enforcement hanging over them. 
III. CONSTRUCTION OF § 1464. 
Pacifica contends that the ·term "indecent language" in § 1464 
should, as a matter of statutory construction, be limited to 
language that is constitutionally obscene. It relies on United 
States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973), 
and Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 115 (1974), where th~ ' 
Court construed 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1461, and 1305(a), which 
prohibit the importation and mailing of 'b.bscene, lewd, lascivious, 
indecent, filthy, or vile" articles, to encompass only what is 
constitutionally obscene, in order to avoid void-for-vagueness 
attacks. It also points out that in United States v. Simpson, 
561 F.2d 53 (CA7 1977), the court, relying on 12 200-Foot Reels, 
held that § 1464's definition of "indecent" should be limited to 
... 6 • 
I~Yf ~.e.~cJ ~ 
, • LA-«Jc-< ~J' ~ 
the constitutionally obscene. ~ • 
~~ 
The FCC and the SG reply that the Court in 12 200-foot Reels 
and Hamling made no reference to § 1464, and did not purport to 
decide what its use of "indecent" means. Moreover, § 1464 was 
enacted as part of the FCC Act, not part of the statutes considered 
in the other cases. The use of the disjunctive "obscene, indecent, 
or profane" in § 1464 evidences a Congressional intent to reach 
more than mere obscenity. In addition, the SG asserts, § 1464, 
unlike the other statutes, was meant to reach words themselves, 
without regard to their context. Finally, if the use of "indecent" 
in § 1464, either as construed by the FCC or as it might be 
construed, is neither unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, then 
there is no reason to put a narrowing gloss on the term. 
Although this issue is not without difficulty, my own view 
is that Congress probably meant to reach all language that 
proscribed, whether or not it is "obscene." 
\ 
constitut~ona :.!:._ co~d be 
Here, unlike 12 200-Foot Reels and Hamling, at least a colorable ; ' 
argument can be made that nonobscene matter constitutionally 
can be banned, because it is the broadcast media that are involved. 
In this situation, I would find it necessary to confront the 
constitutional issues that are presented by the FCC's attempt to 
define what nonobscene but "indecent" language may be proscribed, 
rather than construing § 1464 so as to avoid the issue. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 1464 AS CONSTRUED. 
A. Pacifica. Pacifica's strongest argument begins from 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), where the Court reversed 
the conviction for "disturbing the peace by offensive conduct" 
of a young man who wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" 
in the halls of a courthouse. Although "women and children" had 
viewed the jacket, 403 U.S., at 16, the Court rejected any argument 
that the audience was "captive": 
"[P]ersons confronted with Cohen's jacket were in a quite 
different posture than, say, those subjected to the raucous 
emissions of sound trucks blaring outside their residences. 
Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid 
further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting 
their eyes." Id., at 21. 
Offensiveness, without more, was not sufficient justification 
to ban use of the offending word: 
"How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive 
word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public 
debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable 
to the most squemish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable 
general principle exists for stopping short of that result 
were we to affirm the judgment below •••• 
"Additionally, we cannot overlook the fact, because it 
is well illustrated by the episode involved here, that 
much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative 
function: it conveys not only 'ideas capable of relatively 
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible 
emotions as well." Id., at 25-26. 
See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S., at 210-211: 
"Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our 
political and moral, sensitivities. Nevertheless, the 
Constitution does not permit government to decide which types 
of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to 
require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. 
Rather, absent the narrow circumstances described above, 
the burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid further 
bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] 
eyes.' "(Quoting Cohen.) 
From all this, Pacifica argues that the FCC cannot ban nonobscene 
speech on the ground that it is offensive to some people. 
In addition, Pacifica argues that the FCC's four justifications 
for treating broadcast media differently will not withstand 
scrutiny~ The FCC's reasons, and Pacifica's replies, are as 
follows: 
1. "Radio receivers are in the home, a place where people's 
privacy is entitled to extra deference, see Rowan v. Post Office, 
397 U.S. 728 (1970)." The answer is that Rowan only allowed the 
government to prevent material from reaching the home where 
an unwilling recipient had asked it to. The FCC ban is much 
different because it prevents both willing and unwilling recipients 
from receiving mat~erial. . In addition, the degree of intrusiveness 
into the home is minimal, since a simple turn of the dial can tune 
offensive material out. This is not like a soundtruck case, where 
one cannot escape even in the confines of one's own home. 
2. "Unconsenting adults may tune in a station without any 
warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast." 
And they can tune it out again just as quickly. A radio, like _ , . 
"the screen of a drive-in theater is not 'so obtrusive as to make 
it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to 
it.' " Erznoznik, 422 U.S., at 212. Or, as Lehman v. City 
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) put it, "The radio 
can be turned off, but not the billboard or streetcar placard." 
3. "There is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which 
the government must therefore license in the public interest." 
But this rationale can be used only to increase, not to limit, 
the range of material that is available through the broadcast 
media. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) 
(holding that the Fairness Doctrine does not violate the First 
Amendment). 
4. "Children have access to radios and in many cases are 
unsupervised by parents." This argument cannot justify a rule 
as broad as the FCC's. First, there was no evidence before the 
FCC as to when children listen to the radio, when they are 
not supervised by parents, or the like. Thus, the FCC's "channeling" 
approach rests on its guesses about these facts, and nothing more. 
In addition, the "channeling" approach is not like that approved 
~v. 
in/American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), for here, unlike 
there, it operates to prevent ~ many adults from obtaining access 
to desired material altogether. Rules that are intended to protect 
children cannot be applied to limit the fare that is available 
to adults to what is considered suitable for children: 
"The State insists that, by thus quarantining the 
general reading public against books not too rugged for 
grown men and women in order to shield juvenile innocence, ~ ~ 
it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare. 
Surelft' this is to burn the house to roast the pig • • • 
' • • • The incidence of this enactment is to reduce 
the adult population • • • to reading only what is fit for 
children." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-384 (1957). 
Even where material is judged in terms of its effects on 
children, it must be judged as a whole, not by particular words 
considered out of context: 
"Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to 
minors. Nor can such a broad restriction be justified by 
any other government interest pertaining to minors. Speech 
that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other 
legitimate prosceiption cannot be suppressed solely to 
protect the young from unsuitable ideas or imap,es that 
a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. ' 
Erznoznik, 422 U.S., at 214. And even though parents have in 
interest in raising their children, nothing in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), authorizes the government to make 
these choices on behalf of parents. Even if it did, there has 
been no showing that parents generally wish to keep from their 
children "indecent" language, regardless of context. 
Finally, Pacifica argues, even if the FCC's Order should be 
judged as applied, rather than on its face, its application here 
was not valid. The FCC made no showing that children were likely 
to be in the audience at 2 p.m. and, in fact, independent surveys 
show that there are fewer children in the radio audience during 
the 10:00 a.m. to 3:oo p.m. time slot than for any other execpt 
the midnight-to- 6:00 a.m. period. Brief for *~ Pacifica at 48 
n.40. Moreover, the FCC expressly declined to consider whether the 
Carlin routine had any redeeming value in the context in which it 
was played. 
B. The Soliciter General. The SG, who is a statutory party 
to this case, agrees with Pacifica that the FCC's Order, on its 
face, violates the First Amendment. His positiont is not, however, 
that the FCC cannot ban indecent language at all. His analysis 
proceeds as follows: 
1. First, the FCC's justifications all are insufficient to 
justify a ban as broad as this one. He rejects the the argument 
that the FCC can limit what is broadcast because of the scarcity 
of radio channels, contending that this rationale justifies only 
requirements that stations broadcast diverse sorts of programming. 
He also rejects the notion that radio's intrusiveness into the 
home justifies the ban, because of the ease withWhich it may 
be tuned out. He admits that the desire to protect children 
from indecent language is a legitimate one, but he argues that: 
"The basic difficulty [with the FCC's approach] is that it 
is impossible, as a practical matter, to segregate the 
radio audience between adults and minors ••• [A]s things 
are, the inevitable effect of a ban aimed at protecting 
minors is to 'reduce the adult population,' at least during 
most waking hours, to hearing on radion 'only what is fit 
for children.' Butler v. Michigan. That cannot be squared 
with the First Amendment." Brief for SG at 34-35. 
2. Although the SG is not very explicit about what 
alternative approach might be valid, he does make a couple of points 
worth considering. First, he suggests that indecent language that 
is deliberately used to assault the listeners' sensitivities could 
r:w:;?P s'Ta ~ 
be banned whenever it is broadcast: 
imposition of 
"[§1464] authorizes the/sanctions upon the radio broadcast 
tlie words involved here when, in context, although they do 
appeal to the prurient interest, they are directed at any 
person, or at the audience generally, in a deliberately 
hostile manner, or when they are · uttered, not innocently 
or merely for emphasis, but are spewed forth without any 
arguable justification in a conscious attempt to shock, 
offend, or outrage." 
Brief for SG at 40-41. Second, he suggests that children still 
can be protected to some extent, without reducing adult fare to 
a level fit only for children: 
p:f 
not 
"[T]he Commission might properly prohibit the inclusion 
of the offending words in any radio broadcast specifically 
directed at younger children, regardless of when broadcast." 
Id., at 41. 
C. The FCC. The FCC, while recognizing that Cohen v. 
now 
California is not without relevance to this case,/contends that 
that two factors distinguish the broadcast media from other 
media and justify its Order: "broadcasting has unique qualities, 
and broadcast licensees bear special obligation." Brief for FCC 
at 30. 
Broadcasting, the FCC . argues, is uniquely intrusive and 
uniquely perya~e, and these differences justify greater protection 
of children. Whereas it takes affirmative action for a child to 
go in search of dirty books or dirty movies, it does not take such 
action to find dirty radio shows: "Broadcasts are much more 
difficult for parents to supervise. Broadcasts are easily 
accessible to young persons even in the privacy of the horne, 
without the need for comparable affirmative acts." Id. Moreover, 
the FCC asserts, broadcasting differs from other media in that 
"it requires affirmative acts of avoidance to escape the stuff _ ,. 
once it has come on the air." Id., at 36. Thus, the FCC must protect 
those people - especially children - who cannot protect themselves. 
As to the broadcasters' "special obligations," the FCC 
argues that "broadcasters are public trustees subject to a higher 
standard of conduct than the morals of the marketplace." Id., at 38. 
This special trust derives from the fact that the government has 
selected them to serve the community through the use of resources -
the airwaves ~ that belong to the community as a whole. 
The FCC also urges that the Court review the order 
narrowly because when it "confronts a different set of facts, 
[it] can determine whether the principles announced in the 
declaratory order should be applied, modified or extended." 
Id., at 42-43. It blames Pacifica for the breadth of the order, 
contending that Pacifica did not point out all the serious works 
of literature that the ban covers when the case was before the 
FCC. Id., at 43. 
D. Discussion. I begin by noting that you have taken the 
position in the past that there is a category of language - neither 
"obscene" nor "fighting words" - which so offends the sensitivities 
that unwilling listeners may be protected from it by the government: 
"[T]he exception to First Amendment protection recognized 
in Chaplinsky is not limited to words whose mere utterance 
entails a high probability of an outbreak of physical 
violence. It also extends to the willful use of scurrilous 
language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an 
unwilling audience." 
* * * * 
"[A] verbal assBU,l t on an unwilling audience may be 
so grossly offensive and emotionally disturbing as to be 
the proper subject of criminal proscription, whether under 
a statute denominating it disorderly conduct, or, more 
accurately, a public nuisance." 
~-se-n-f-:wv. New Jersey, 408 U.s. 901, 905-906 (1972) (Powell, J : , " 
dissenting); see also Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 
4 (1973)(Powell, J., dissenting); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 UoS. 205, 210-211 n. 6 (1975). Assuming that you still 
are of this view, the fact that the FCC's Order reaches language 
that is not constitutionally obscene would not, by itself, invalidate 
the order. 
/2~1- ~. 
~J/'.v '1_, ,._, ~ 
As far as adults are concerned, two features of the Order 
are especially troublesome to me. First, despite the FCC's 
assertions to the contrary, the fact that unwilling adults 
14. 
are free to tune out offensive programming - to avert their 
ears, in effect - seems to me to cut strongly against the notion 
that the FCC must be able to protect adults whose sensitivities 
might be offended. Adult radio listeners are not a captive audience 
in any realistic sense of the word. If the First Amendment requires 
those who might be offended to avert their eyes from the 
jacket in Cohen and the movie screen in Erznoznik, I think that 
it requires no less of radio listeners. Cf. Brown v. Oklahoma, 
408 U.S. 914 (1972)(Powell, J., concurring), where you distinguished 
Rosenfeld on the ground that in Brown, "language of the character 
charged might well have been anticipated by the audience." 
The second feature that especially troubles me is that the 
almost 
FCC Order makes/no attempt to accomodate the asserted interest 
in protecting children with adults' interest in hearing programming 
that is permissible for willing adults. On one hand, I doubt 
whether children need very much to be protected from the occasional 
use, in otherwise valuable programming, of some of the words on 
the FCC's forbidden list. As has been pointed out, there is much 
serious literature that contains some of this language. On 
the other hand, the FCC's Order prevents adults who do not stay 
~E/ up to midnight from hearing such programming, despite whatever 
their own preferences might be. 
The difficult feature of this case, to my mind, is that 
likely is more difficult to supervise childrens' use of 
radio than it is their use of books, films, and the like. Thus, 
it can be argued that the FCC should be able to protect children 
from non-obscene, non-assaultive uses of "indecent" language 
15. 
that their parents would protect them from if they could. The 
analogy, I suppose, would be to ordinances that bar the admission 
of children to topless bars and the like. But even in this -setting, I would argue, context must count for something, both 
to protect the childrens' own First Amendment righ~ see Erznozkik, 
422 U.S., at 212-213, 
/and to provide a measure of protection to adults' rights. Thus, 
even if the basic idea behind the FCC's channeling approach 
is sound - I ~ disturbed by the lack of facts about when 
children actually are in the audience - I think it falls short 
in its complete failure to consider the context in which language 
is used. 
For this reason, I would hold the FCC order overbroad on 
its face. Although it is not eas~ sketch out what a 
constitutionally permissible scheme of regulation might be, 
I think it might contain these features: 
1. Despite the lack of a truly captive adult audience, 
the FCC might be allowed to proscribe deliberately assaultive 
language of the kind described by your Rosenfeld dissent. The 
uses of 
lack of value in such/language, together with the possibility 
that children will hear it, would support this conclusion. 
2.The FCC might be allowed to "channel" works that have a 
good deal of offensive language, yet a good deal of value, into 
time slots that it can demonstrate contain the fewest number 
of unsupervised children. This might not be just the late evening 
hours; as Judge Leventhal hinted, it is entirely conceivable 
that during the early evening hours, parents are capable of 
enough 
supervising their children to a sugficient/extent that the FCC's 
help is not needed. The FCC should be required at least to 
explore this possibility, since adults' rights would be more 
fully protected if programs were made available when they could 
listen to them. Into this category of works might fall such works 
as the Nixon tapes and Carlin's routine. 
3. Works that contain only occasional offensive language 
might be allowed at any hour. Thus, filmed news reports of public 
demonstrations might not be required to be censored for the 
benefit of anyone. Likewise, the occasional conversational use 
of offensive language in a radio discussion show might not bring 
the FCC down on the station that broadcast it. 
* * 
I have not worked this out as far as I would like. But I 
do feel strongly that the FCC has employed something of a meat-ax 
approach where a scalpal would have done better. I think there 
is a need for more refined balancing of the interests involved 
here than the FCC recognized, and I would send the case back to 
it for a second attempt. 
JA 
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76-528 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 
Miscellaneous Preargument Notes 
1. Three statutory provisions are arguably 
(a) Section 1464 of the Criminal Code ("obscene, 
indecent or profane" language on radio is a criminal 
offense). 
(b) Section 326 of the Communications Act 
(forbids radio censorship) . Judge Tamm views this as 
controlling. Bazelon relied solely on First Amendment. 
(c) Section 303(g) authorizes FCC to regulate "in 
the public interest". 
2. FCC argues that § 326 cannot be viewed as 
incompatible with § 1464, as the latter originally was a 
part of §326 itself. 
(a) FCC emphasizes that "indecent" must be viewed 
as having a different meaning from "obscene". 
3. Divergent views of CADC judges. 
(a) Tamm viewed §326, prohibiting censorship, as 
controlling. Also viewed FCC's order as overbroad. 
(b) Bazelon held that the order violated the 
First Amendment, regardless of the statutes. Relying 
2. 
on Miller's definition of obscenity, Bazelon thinks that 
the term "indecent" can have no separate meaning. 
(c) Leventhal dissented (see below} . 
4. Much depends on how one reads FCC order. 
(a} Those who wish to invalidate it (respondent, 
amici and the SG} insist the order must be reading 
sweepingly. 
(b) Those who defend the order (other than FCC, 
there are not many who do}, read it narrowly - as did 
Leventhal. 
5. It is important to understand exactly what FCC 
did. 
(a} Leventhal's view- strongly endorsed by FCC's 
briefs - is that it is the "holding" that must be viewed as 
"' -being all that is before us. The remainder of its 
"Memorandum Opinion and Order" (App. 63} is only 
"informational". 
Ask FCC Counsel. 
(b) As Leventhal notes, the FCC opinion is 
divided into "discussion", "conclusion" (App. 72}, and 
"order". 
3. 
(c) The "order" merely states that the complaint 
filed against Pacificia is granted to extent indicated 
above. 
(d) In its conclusion, FCC characterizes the 
narrative portion as "a declaratory order" rather than "a 
notice of apparent liability". A declaratory order is a 
"flexible device" - largely informational. It binds no 
one. Any one agrieved may request reconsideration. 
Judicial review of commission action then is available. 
6. Judge Leventhal's dissent: 
(a) Holding of FCC is extremely limited: It held 
only: 
"That the language as broadcast was indecent and 
prohibited by §1464". 
(b) yalidity of the holding must be judged, and 
read as applying only to the facts in this case. 
(b) The critical facts were (i) the offensive 
words were "repeated over and over":* (ii) broadcasts in 
the early afternoon when children were "in the audience": 
and (iii) made clear that broadcasts in the evening would 
not be so limited- i.e., would not force adults to listen 
to broadcasts "fit only for children". 
*Leventhal referred to this as "lavishly loving 
reiteration". 
4. 
7. Judge Leventhal's observations relative to his 
rationale. 
{a) Different principles as to children. 
Brennan's dissent in Miller v. California impliedly 
recognized this. 
{b) Miller expanded the Roth definition of 
obscenity to include "patently offensive representations of 
excretory functions". 
{c) Distinguishes Erznoznik and Cohen as dealing 
with a drive-in theater at night and a courthouse neither 
places frequented by young children. 
{d) Emphasized widespread access of radio to 
children. 
{e) Material that may have some literary, 
educational or artistic value to an adult may not have such 
value in a broadcast heard by children. Their 
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(b) Validity of the holding be judged, and •I must 
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read as applying only to the facts in this case. 
(b) The critical facts were (i) the offensive 
words were "repeated over and over"~* (ii) broadcasts in 
the early afternoon when children were "in the audience"1 
and (iii) made clear that broadcasts in the evening would 
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not be so limited - i.e., would not force adults to listen 
to broadcasts "fit only for children". 
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7. Judge Leventhal's observations relative to his 
rationale. 
(a) Different principles as to children. 
Brennan's dissent in Miller v. Califor!lia i-mpliedly 
recognized this. 
(b) Miller expanded the Roth definition of 
obscenity to include "patently offensive representations of 
excretory functions". 
(c) Distinguishes Erznoznik and Cohen as dealing 
' , with a drive-in theater at night and a courthouse neither 
places frequented by young children. 
~ (d) Emphasized widespread access of radio to 
children. 
(e) Material that may have some l i terary, 
educational or artistic value to an adult may not have such 
value in a broadcast heard by children. Their 
understanding and perceptions are different. 
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Dear John, 
I shall await the dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell June 16, 1978 
From: Jim Alt 
Re: Justi£e Stevens' op1n1on for the Court in No. 77-528, 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. 
Although there is much in this opinion with which you 
can agree, you may - as discussed infra - have some trouble 
joining all of Part IV. I discuss each Part of the opinion 
in order. 
Part I (p. 7): This part holds that the FCC's order should 
be viewed and reviewed narrowly, as applied to this case, and 
not broadly, as if it were a general rule of prospective 
application. As I recall, this is the view you took of the 
case, and it was Judge Leventhal's view. 
Part II (pp. 8-11): This part holds that 47 U.S.C. § 326, 
which prohibits the FCC from exercising powers of "censorship" 
over licensees, does not bar the order in this case. As I read 
the opinion, it holds that § 326 means no more than that the 
FCC may not exercise prior restraints over broadcasts; the section ·· 
does not speak at all to whether the FCC may punish licensees 
subsequently for their broadcasts. 
I was a little surprised to find that the opinion does not 
hold that the sweep of § 326 is the same as that of the First 
Amend~ent, which had been my initial view. Since § 326 was 
enacted at a time when the First Amendment was not thought to 
bar much more than prior restraints, it is not surprising to find 
•. 
·. 
that this was the early understanding of the section's meaning. 
J 
It could be argued, though, that the meaning of § 326 changed 
along with that of the First Amendment. In the final analysis, 
-
however, it does not make much difference whether § 326 is 
viewed as crystalizing the old view of what "censorship" is, 
or as expanding with the First Amendment. Even if § 326 is 
viewed as static, the First Amendment itself always will be 
available to challenge FCC actions that arguably infringe on 
2. 
the broadcasters' rights, but do not constitute "prior restraintso" f: 
For this reason, . I would have no difficulty joining Part II. 
Part III (pp. 12-15): This part holds that 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 
which prohibits the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane" 
language, covers more ground than that encompassed in the Court's 
constitutionally 
concept of the/"obscene." It also holds that Carlin's routine 
used language that was "indecent" within the meaning of § 1464. 
I agree with the first conclusion, and Pacifica does not dispute 
------~~---------------------~ ---------------------------the second. 
Part IV (pp. 16-26): This part holds that the FCC's order 
does not violate Pacifica's First Amendment rights. My problem 
with this section is that Justice Stevens is making many of 
the same points that he made in Part III of Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63-73 (1976) - which you pointedly 
did not join, see 427 U.S., at 73 n.l (Powell, J., concurring) • 
.1.. -1- .Tv q /(-AL~-t> #LJ2u 
In particular, he beats the d 16UCf and long for the pro~osition 
that the government can speech on the basis of its 
•k/ --
content~- and he argues that the degree of regulation may vary 
-::_/ I am particularly distressed at his characterization 







according to the value which the Court thinks inheres in the 
particular speech at issue. Thus, although the speech at issue 
here is "not entirely outside the protection of the First 
Amendment," it need not be given the same protection "as that 
accorded to expressions of political or religious opinion." 
I 
Opinion at 21. These are the same points he made in Part III 
of Mini Theatres, to which you replied: 
3. 
"I do not think we need reach, nor am I inclined to a gree 
with, the holding in Part III (and supporting discussion) 
that nonobscene, erotic materials may be treated differently 
under the First Amendment principles from other forms 
of protected expression. I do not consider the conclusions 
in Part I of the opinion to depend on distinctions between 
protected speech." 427 U.S., at 73 n.l. 
I think that Justice Stevens is trying, as he did in 
Mini Theatres, to work out a "sliding scale" theory of Firs t 
Amendment protection. The more "valuable" the speech, the 
more First Amendment protection it would be entitled to. Thus, 
"political" speech probably would get the most protection, and 
speech of the kind at issue here would get the least - although 
even it still would get some protection. This theory is in 
conflict with the Court's traditional approach of deciding 
simply whether speech is "protected" or "unprotected," under 
which the Court has characterized obscenity, fighting words, 
of Mini Theatres as "refus[ing] to hold that a 'statutory 
classification is unconstitutional because it is based on the 
content of communication protected by the First Amendment.' " 
Opinion at 19, quoting 427 u.s., at 52. The quote from Mini Theaters 
is from the introductory paragraph of the Court's opinion, Which 
purported to state the "primary question presented" and which I 
do not understand you to have joined. See 427 U.S., at 73, 




~nd incitements as "unprotected." But all speech that fell 
into the "protected" category received the same amount of 
protection, without regard to further distinctions based 
on the content of the speech. 
4. 
One argument in favor of Justice Stevens' approach is that 
it simply carries one step further what the Court has been 
doing all along. Even to make the decision whether speech is 
"protected" or "unprotected," the Court must look to the content 
of the speech. Another argument is that Justice Stevens' 
approach affords at least some protection to speech at the lower 
end of the scale - such as that here - that otherwise might 
be held "unprotected" altogether. The strongest argument 
against the approach is that it requires the Court to decide 
which speech is most "valuable", which is less "valuable", and 
which is least "valuable." The danger is that the Justices' 
~~own ~arying values will feed into the decision too much, whereas 
d some kind of concensus may be reached where the decision is simply 
whether speech is "protected" or not. In addition, the decisions 
that ~ the Court will be called upon to make may become impossibly 
complicated and refined. There is a parallel to be drawn here 
to . the debate over whether Equal Protection analysis should 
be divided simply into "strict scrutiny" and "rational relation" 
tests, or whether, as Justice Marshall has urged, a "sliding scale" 
test should be used. 
If you are not inclined to adopt the "sliding scale" 






Mini Theatres A S:iiJit - the problem remains as 
to what to do here. I doubt whether you could join Part IV 
in its entirety. At the same time, I doubt whether it would 
be consistent with ptior law - particularly Cohen v. California 
403 U.S. 15 (19 ), to hold that the language used by Carlin 
is unprotected altogether. It seems to me possible to reach 
5. 
the same result in this case by emphasizing the following points: 
(1) The FCC's holding does not bar adults from access to 
Carlin's record. They may buy it in stores and play it at home, 
and they probably will be able to hear it over the radio late at 
night. Here, as in Mini Theatres, the FCC simply has "zoned" 
speech so as to serve an important value. Compare your Mini 
Theatres concurrence at 427 U.S., at 76-79. 
(2) The important value that is served - protecting children 
but protected 
from objectionable/speech - has been recognized in the past. 
~' Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629. Radio differs from --other media because it is uniquely accessible ~o children. (I 
4-~ 
would emphasize this point considerably more than does Justice 
Stevens, and de-emphasize the argument that this speech has 
less "value" than other speech.) 
(3) It also might be possible to argue that this speech 
is akin to a "verbal assault" even to so:ne adults. Compare, 
~' your dissent in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 
905-906 (1972). It would be tricky to make this argument, since 
its implication is that the speech is not protected at all. The 
argument would have to be that the bamadcaster cormnits an "assault" 




by broadcasting Carlin's record during afternoon hours when 
both children and adults who may E not be aware of the coming 
content are liable to be injured by the broadcast. 
* * * * * 
This case is difficult to solve without some reference 
to the content of the recordx at issue. At the same time, 
I do not think it is necessary to downplay the Court's tradition 
that the degree of protection due speech should not depend on 
the content of speech quite so much as Justice Stevens does. 
Justice Sax Stevens needs your E vote to make a majority, so 
it might be possible to get him to remove portions of his 
opinion that take xk his Mini Theatres line. Alternatively, you 
could decide that he is correct in taking that approach, and 
join him altogether. The third alternative is to x write for 
yourself with regard to Part IV, a task with which I would be 
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No. 77-528, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: 1st draft 
[ArvT[_ uVNE (\/qli] 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join parts I, II, and III of MR. JUSTICE 
STEVENS' opinion without reservation. ~ eeat~ part l~~ar 
.......--
errTp'hasis Lls..-..t. lhe Court today reviews only the 
Commission's holding that Carlin's monologue was indecent 
"as broadcast" at two o'clock in the afternoon, and not 
the broad sweep of the Commission's opinion. Ante, at 7, 
16-18. In addition to being consistent with our settled 
practice of not deciding constitutional issues 
unnecessarily, see ante, at 7; Ashwander v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority, 297 u.s. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring), this narrow focus also is conducive to 
the thought£~~ !PM orderly development of this relatively 
new and difficult area of law, in the first instance by 
the Commission, and then by the reviewing courts. See 
Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, U • S • App. D • C • 
, 556 F.2d 9, 35-37 (1977) (Leventhal, J., 
dissenting) • Since I expect the Commission to proceed in 
a cautious and reasonable manner in the future, as it has 
in the past, cf. Brief for Petitioner 42-43, I do not 
foresee an undue "chilling" effect on broadcasters' 
I also agree with much that is said in Part IV of 
2. 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its conclusion that 
the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the 
tt:t. ...r 
First Amendment. Because I ~t subscribe to all that 
is said in Part IV, however, I state my views ~~ ehi8 
t~8~e separately. 
I 
It is conceded that the monologue at issue ~ 
is not obscene,. a~ -i:aai!M: in the constitutional sense. See 
56 F.C.C.2d 94, (1975); Brief for Petitioner 18. Nor, 
in this context, does its language constitute "fighting 
words" within the meaning of Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568 (1942). Some of the words used have been 
held protected by the First Amendment in other cases and 
contexts. ~' Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 
(1974); Hess v. Indiana, 414 u.s. 105 (1973); Papish v. 
University of Missouri, 410 u.s. 667 (1973); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Eaton v. City of 
Tulsa, 415 u.s. 697 (1974). 
) consistently with the First Amendment, be ,!ll!ellented ~roHtp--
~ punished for delivering the same monologue to a live 
audience composed of adults who, knowing what to expect, 
chose to attend his performance. See Brown v. Oklahoma, 
408 u.s. 914 (1972) (POWELL, J., concurring in result). 
3. 
And I would assume that an adult could not 
constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a recording 
or transcript of the monologue and playing or reading it 
in the privacy of his own home. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 u.s. 557 (1969). 
Di!liiipite 8l.J.-~i&• it also is true that the 
1\ 
~~ ... ~~·A_. 
language employed is, to most people,~~~ me3t 
offensive ~A ehe EpgJ~sh tilA9W&. It was chosen • 
&p~eifica~~ for this quality, and it was repeated over 
~ 
and over ~a sort of linguistic shock treatment. 
t\ 
-- J4~~ 
o4think Jhe Commissioierr• in characterizing the Ptdtfbetl 
category of language used here as "patently offensive" to 
- " . 
most people~ +4f~~~ iJ-f ~ • 11-~ ._::1-
..ll..,~r ~ ~~k,. 
e issue 'iA ehii!l i'?Se is whether the Commission 
may impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for 
broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the 
afternoon. The Commission's primary concern was to 
~-~4 .. ..._.r 
prevent the I'IQA~&9'1e from reaching the ears of 
~ 
unsupervised children who were likely to be in the 
audience at that hour. In essence, the Commission sought 
to "zone" the monologue to hours when the fewest 
4. 
unsupervised children would be exposed to it. See 56 
F. C. C. 2d, at In my view, this consideration 
provides strong support for the Commission's 
__} ~,/ ........-::-
holding. 12 3 ~ 
The Court P•8of:IioguliiiLY has recognized society's 
right to "adopt more stringent controls on communicative 
materials available to youths than on those available to 
adults." Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 
212 (1975); see also,~' Miller v. California, 413 u.s. 
15, 36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
636-643 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 u.s. 184, 195 
( 1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.) . This recognition stems in 
large part from the fact that "a child . • . is not 
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice 
which is the presupposition of First Amendment 
guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 
(1968) (STEWART, J., concurring in result) . Thus, children 
may not be able to protect themselves from speech which, 
although shocking to most adults, generally may be avoided 
by the unwilling through the exercise of judicious 
choice. At the same time, such speech may have a deeper 
and more lasting negative effect on a child than an 
adult. For these reasons, society may prevent the general 
dissemination of such speech to children, leaving to 
5. 
parents the decision as to what speech of this kind their 
children shall hear and repeat: 
11 [C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently 
recognized that the parents' claim to authority 
in their own household to direct the rearing of 
their children is basic in the structure of our 
society. 'It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside 
first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v. 
Massachusetts, [321 u.s. 158, 166 (1944)]. The 
legislature could properly conclude that parents 
and others, teachers for example, who have this 
primary responsibility for children's well-being 
are entitled to the support of laws designed to 
aid discharge of that responsibility ... 
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639; see also Carey v. 
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 709-710 
( 1977) (POWELL, J. ,~oncurring in p~ t) • ~ 
I~n-~m~y~v~t~e~~- ~e Commission properly held that the 
speech from which society may attempt to shield its 
children is not limited to that which appeals to the 
youthful prurient interest. The language involved in this 
~ .. ~ ~ ca,..c..; 
case ~e~ ial'\ii8 -ptn p er -a.Jw-b3'X'5 -e~ f:Hl!"Crrl!al 
~pe~v4eiOI~ &~8 ac potentially degrading and harmful to 
h . d . S' 8 . . ~f t' c 11 ren~s ~ representat1onA~5eecri~~180 o Aero 1c 
First Amendment bars government from 
prohibiting willing adults from communicating with each 
other in such terms, it does not prevent the government 
from giving parents an opportunity to teach their childr n 
to do 
6. 
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind 
of speech to children may be limited without also limiting 
willing adults' access to it. Sellers of printed and 
recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live 
performances may be required to shut their doors to 
children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults' 
access. See Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 634-635. The 
difficulty is that such a physical separation of the 
audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media. 
both adults and unsupervised children are likely to be in 
the broadcast audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach 
willing adults without also reaching children. This, 
then, 
a..d.L£~~ 
is c;;ule 8:! l!h@' ditf'E!"I>eiiC@15 between the broadcast and 
1\ 
other media to which the Court often has adverted as 
justifying a different treatment of the broadcast media 
for First Amendment purposes. See Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) ~ Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 
94, 101 (1973)~ Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367, 386-387 (1969)~ Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 
333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol 
Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 
7. 
(1972); see generally Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 
U.S. 495, 502-503 (1952). In my view, the Commission was 
entitled to give substantial weight to this difference in 
reaching its decision in this case. 
where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted 
by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds. Erznoznik 
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Cohen 
v. California, 403 u.s. 15, 21 (1971); Rowen v. Post 
Office Dept., 397 u.s. 728 (1970). Although the First 
' " . 
Amendment may require unwilling adults to absorb the first 
blow of offensive but protected speech when they are in 
public before they turn away, see, ~, Erznoznik, supra, 
t C v 
at 210-211 J a different order of values obtains in the 
home. "That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary 
ol7Jee+i~~le 
of the home and subject toJebjeetiobdjLspeech and other 
sound does not mean we must be captives everywhere." 
Rowan v. Post Office Dept., supra, at 738. ::Ji!or !Rl' ui.OI'I$, he 
Commission also was entitled to give this factor ~ 
• 
~···'!~~ -\ weight in the circumstances of the instant case. This is 
~"·· .. ~k<.k.Jl 
not to say, however, that the Commission has 'Eil ~eaernl 
h 
?u~ .. ,., J'k.\ ~·.;r._, ~ ~ 
~ e••r~-.,. U..J ~ ~.-.-4{ .. ~~ ~~ 
~~.,;u41;;, ~ ~ .. u -,·~~ ,A.Jbd4 ~ 
license to decide what speech, protected in other media, ~ 
may be banned from the airwaves in order to protec~ 
~., 
unwilling adults from momentary exposure to it in the~~ 
~~~ 
It is argued that despite society's right ~ 
protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite 
everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive 
speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case 
is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from 
listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the 
early afternoon hours. It is said that this ruling will 
have the effect of "reduc [ ing] the adult population . ; ' 
to [hearing] only what is fit for children." Butler v. 
Michigan, 352 u.s. 380, 383 (1957). This argument is not 
c~~Q~m~ The Commission certainly should consider 
it as it develops standards in this area. But f am Rot ..,....,. 
OQR 11iQ~ 'ih~ it is sufficiently strong to leave the 
~ 
Commission eaeiFe~ powerless to act in efte circumstances 
.4-·~-~~., -~ 
"eef this case. 
A. 
The Commission's holding does not prevent willing 
adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending his 
performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript 
9. 
reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion. On its 
face, it does not prevent respondent from broadcasting the 
4t.... 
monologue during evening hours when fewer children are 
" 
likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting 
discussions of the contemporary use of language at any 
time during the day. I'A my vi-.w.,~e Commission's 
holding, and certainly the Court's holding today, does not 
'jl-~ • ...,4,.~ ·-~~ .... ~ 
speak to cases involving the isolated use of a~i~w~ leees• 
word in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished 
from the linguistic shock treatment administered by 
respondent here. In short, I agree that on the facts of 
this case, the Commission's order did not violate 
respondent's First Amendment rights. 
II 
As the foregoing demonstrates, I agree with much 
that is said in part IV of MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion. 
See ante, at 22-26. I do not join that part, however, 
J./) ~t 
because I li!le:H:~ MA aaaele' ot!-e subscribe to the theory that 
.\ 
the Justices of this Court (2enerall~ are free~o decide 
hA- Hw-~,.,_, l1'f ;:::t:;.; ~~ 
~ which speech protected by the First Amendment is most 
"valuable" and hence deserving of the most protection, and 
which is less "valuable" and hence deserving of less 
protection. Compare ante, at 18-22~ Young v. American 
10. 
Mini Theatres, 427 u.s. 50, 63-73 (1976) (opinion of 
STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73 n.l (POWELL, J., 
concurring).~/ In my view, the result in this case does 
not turn on whether Carlin's monologue, viewed as a whole, 
or the words that comprise it, have more or less "value" 
than a candidate's campaign speech. This is a judgment 
for each person to make, not one for the judges to impose 
upon him. 
~.~~ ... ~ 
The result turns instead on the unique~q~ali~s 
of the broadcast media, combined ~rimar~~ with society's 
'QgQ9Ci~ right to protect its children from speech 
• 
generally agreed to be4~~eir years, and 
secondarily wit~willing aduy...,se;:~teres~n ' 
not being assaulted by such offensive speech in their 
~~ 
homes. ~ iddiei~, I doubt whether today's decision will 
prevent any adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message 
in Carlin's own words from doing so, and from~~or 
A-~:·(,.. ~:~· ·~ ~ 1-o N-4 ,.,... •• .::4 
himsel~-aae-i.b J;' of the message and words. Cf. 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S., at 77-79 
(POWELL, J., concurring). These a~ewe are the grounds 
upon which I join the judgment of the Court as to part IV. 
,._ ... 
FOOTNOTES 
*The Court has, however, created a limited 
exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech 
within the protection of the First Amendment. See Ohralik 
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No. 77-528, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
I join parts I, II, and III of MR. JUSTICE 
STEVENS' opinion without reservation. The Court today 
reviews only the Commission's holding that Carlin's 
monologue was indecent "as broadcast" at two o'clock in the 
afternoon, and not the broad sweep of the Commission's 
opinion. Ante, at 7, 16-18. In addition to being 
consistent with our settled practice of not deciding 
constitutional issues unnecessarily, see ante, at 7; 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 
345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), this narrow focus 
also is conducive to the orderly development of this 
relatively new and difficult area of law, in the first 
instance by the Commission, and then by the reviewing 
courts. See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, ___ U.S. App. 
D.C. 556 F.2d 9, 35-37 (1977) (Leventhal, 
J., dissenting). 
2. 
I also agree with much that is said in part IV of 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its conclusion that 
the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the 
First Amendment. Because I do not subscribe to all that is 
said in part IV, however, I state my views separately. 
I 
It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is 
not obscene in the constitutional sense. See 56 F.C.C.2d 
94, (1975); Brief for Petitioner 18. Nor, in this 
context, does its language constitute "fighting words" 
within the meaning of Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942) . Some of the words used have been held 
protected by the First Amendment in other cases and 
contexts. ~' Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); 
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Papish v. University 
of Missouri, 410 u.s. 667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15 (1971); see also Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 u.s. 
697 (1974). I do not think Carlin, consistently with the 
First Amendment, could be punished for delivering the same 
monologue to a live audience composed of adults who, 
knowing what to expect, chose to attend his performance. 
See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 u.s. 914 (1972) (POWELL, J., 
concurring in result). And I would assume that an adult 
could not constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a 
recording or transcript of the monologue and playing or 
3. 
reading it in the privacy of his own home. Cf. Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
But it also is true that the language employed is, 
to most people, vulgar and offensive. It was chosen 
specifically for this quality, and it was repeated over and 
over as a sort of linguistic shock treatment. The 
Commission did not err in characterizing the narrow 
category of language used here as "patently offensive" to 
most people regardless of age. It was at least wholly 
without taste. 
The issue, however, is whether the Commission may 
impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for 
broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the 
afternoon. The Commission's primary concern was to prevent 
the broadcast from reaching the ears of unsupervised 
children who were likely to be in the audience at that 
hour. In essence, the Commission sought to "zone" the 
monologue to hours when the fewest unsupervised children 
would be exposed to it. See 56 F.C.C.2d, at In my 
view, this consideration provides strong support for the 
Commission's holding.!/ 
The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt 
more stringent controls on communicative materials 
available to youths than on those available to adults." 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 u.s. 205, 212 
(1975); see also,~' Miller v. California, 413 u.s. 15, 
36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
636-643 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 u.s. 184, 195 
(1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). This recognition stems in 
4. 
large part from the fact that "a child . . . is not 
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which 
is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 (1968) (STEWART, J., 
concurring in result). Thus, children may not be able to 
protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to 
most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling 
through the exercise of judicious choice. At the same 
time, such speech may have a deeper and more lasting 
negative effect on a child than an adult. For these 
reasons, society may prevent the general dissemination of 
such speech to children, leaving to parents the decision as 
to what speech of this kind their children shall hear and 
repeat: 
"[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently 
recognized that the parents' claim to authority 
in their own household to direct the rearing of 
their children is basic in the structure of our 
society. 'It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside 
first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v. 
Massachusetts, [321 u.s. 158, 166 (1944)]. The 
legislature could properly conclude that parents 
and others, teachers for example, who have this 
primary responsibility for children's well-being 
are entitled to the support of laws designed to 
aid discharge of that responsibility." 
5 • 
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639; see also Carey v. 
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 709-710 
(1977) (POWELL, J., concurring in part). The Commission 
properly held that the speech from which society may 
attempt to shield its children is not limited to that which 
appeals to the youthful prurient interest. The language 
involved in this case could be as potentially degrading and 
harmful to children as ~representations of many erotic 
acts. 
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind 
of speech to children may be limited without also limiting 
willing adults' access to it. Sellers of printed and 
recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live 
performances may be required to shut their doors to 
children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults' 
access. See Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 634-635. The 
difficulty is that such a physical separation of the 
audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media. 
During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and 
unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast 
audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults 
without also reaching children. This, then, is one of the 
distinctions between the broadcast and other media to which 
the Court often has adverted as justifying a different 
treatment of the broadcast media for First Amendment 
6 . 
purposes. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 
384 (1977); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-387 (1969); 
Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 
1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting 
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); see generally 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503 
(1952). In my view, the Commission was entitled to give 
substantial weight to this difference in reaching its 
decision in this case. 
A second difference, not without relevance, is 
that broadcasting - unlike most other forms of 
communication - comes directly into the home, the one place 
where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted 
by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds. Erznoznik v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 u.s. 205, 209 (1975); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowen v. Post Office 
Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Although the First Amendment 
may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of 
offensive but protected speech when they are in public 
before they turn away, see, ~, Erznoznik, supra, at 
210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 u.s. 901, 
903-909 (1972) (Powell, Jr., dissenting), a different order 
of values obtains in the home. "That we are often 
7 . 
'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to 
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must 
be captives everywhere." Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 
supra, at 738. The Commission also was entitled to give 
this factor appropriate weight in the circumstances of the 
instant case. This is not to say, however, that the 
Commission has an unrestricted license to decide what 
speech, protected in other media, may be banned from the 
airwaves in order to protect unwilling adults from 
momentary exposure to it in their homes.~/ Making the 
sensitive judgments required in these cases is not easy. 
But this responsibility has been reposed initially in the 
Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect. 
It is argued that despite society's right to 
protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite 
everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive 
speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case 
is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from 
listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the early 
afternoon hours. It is said that this ruling will have the 
effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population ... to 
[hearing] only what is fit for children." Butler v. 
Michigan, 352 u.s. 380, 383 (1957). This argument is not 
without force. The Commission certainly should consider it 
as it develops standards in this area. But it is not 
sufficiently strong to leave the Commission powerless to 
act in circumstances such as those in this case. 
8. 
The Commission's holding does not prevent willing 
adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending his 
performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript 
reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion. On its 
face, it does not prevent respondent from broadcasting the 
monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are 
likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting 
discussions of the contemporary use of language at any time 
during the day. The Commission's holding, and certainly 
the Court's holding today, does not speak to cases 
involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word 
in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from 
the linguistic shock treatment administered by respondent 
here. In short, I agree that on the facts of this case, 
the Commission's order did not violate respondent's First 
Amendment rights. 
II 
As the foregoing demonstrates, I agree with much 
that is said in part IV of MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion. 
See ante, at 22-26. I do not join that part, however, 
because I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices 
of this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of 
its content which speech protected by the First Amendment 
is most "valuable" and hence deserving of the most 
protection, and which is less "valuable" and hence 
deserving of less protection. Compare ante, at 18-22; 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 u.s. 50, 63-73 
(1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73 n.l 
(POWELL, J., concurring) .l/ In my view, the result in 
this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue, 
9. 
viewed as a whole, or the words that comprise it, have more 
or less "value" than a candidate's campaign speech. This 
is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the 
judges to impose upon him. 
The result turns instead on the unique 
characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with 
society's right to protect its children from speech 
generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years, and 
secondarily with the interest of unwilling adults in not 
being assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes. 
Moreover, I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any 
: " 
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's 
own words from doing so, and from making for himself a 
value judgment as to the merit of the message and words. 
Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S., at 77-79 
(POWELL, J., concurring). These are the grounds upon which 
I join the judgment of the Court as to part IV. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughtful 
opinion in the Court of Appeals. ___ u.s. App., at 
, 556 F.2d, at 32-35 (Leventhal, J~dissenting). 
2. It is true that the radio listener quickly may 
tune out speech that is offensive to him. In addition, 
broadcasters may preface programs with warnings as to their 
content. But such warnings do not help the unsuspecting 
listener who tunes in at the middle of a program. In this 
respect, too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and 
records, which may carry warnings on their faces, and from 
motion pictures and live performances, which may carry 
r ~ 
w~ings on their mariuees. 
3. The Court has, however, created a limited 
exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech 
within the protection of the First Amendment. See Ohralik 
v. Ohio State Bar Association, u.s. (1978). 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, J~IZ(c) 
I join parts I, II, &BQ III JUSTICE 
The Court today 
reviews only the Commission's holding that Carlin's 
monologue was indecent "as broadcast" at two o'clock in the 
afternoon, and not the broad sweep of the Commission's 
opinion. Ante, at 7 ~8 In addition to being 
consistent with our settled practice of not deciding 
constitutional issues unnecessarily, see ante, at 7; 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 
345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), this narrow focus 
also is conducive to the orderly development of this 
relatively new and difficult area of . law, in the fir s t 
instance by the Commission, and then by the reviewing 
courts. See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, ___ U.S. App. 
D.C. 556 F. 2d 9, 35-37 (1977) (Leventha l, 
J., dissenting) . 
2. 
I also agree with much that is said in part IV of 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its conclusion that 
the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the 
First Amendment. Because I do not subscribe to all that is 
said in part IV, however, I state my views separately. 
I 
It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is 
not obscene in the constitutional sense. See 56 F.C.C.2d 
94, (1975); Brief for Petitioner 18. Nor, in this 
context, does its language constitute "fighting words" 
wi~hin the meaning of Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942). Some of the words used have been held 
protected by the First Amendment in other cases and 
contexts. ~,Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); 
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Papish v. University 
of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 
u.s. 15 (1971); see also Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 
697 (1974). I do not think Carlin, consistently with the 
First Amendment, could be punished for delivering the same 
monologue to a live audience composed of adults who, 
knowing what to expect, chose to attend his performance. 
See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (POWELL, J., 
concurring in result). And I would assume that an adult 
could not constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a 
recording or transcript of the monologue and playing or 
reading it in the privacy of his own home. Cf. Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 u.s. 557 (1969). 
3. 
But it also is true that the language employed is, 
to most people, vulgar and offensive. It was chosen 
specifically for this quality, and it was repeated over and 
over as a sort of linguistic shock treatment. The 
Commission did not err in characterizing the narrow 
category of language used here as "patently offensive" to 
most people regardless of age. It was at least wholly 
without taste. 
The issue, however, is whether the Commission may 
impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for 
broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the 
afternoon. The Commission's primary concern was to prevent 
the broadcast from reaching the ears of unsupervised 
children who were likely to be in the audience at that 
hour. In essence, the Commission sought to "zone" the 
monologue to hours when the fewest unsupervised children 
would be exposed to it. See 56 F.C.C.2d, at In my • ' 
view, this consideration provides strong support for the 
Commission's holding.l/ 
The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt 
more stringent controls on communicative materials 
available to youths than on those available to adults." 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 
(1975); see also, ~' Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 
36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
636-643 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 u.s. 184, 195 
(1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). This recognition stems in 
large part from the fact that "a child ... is not 
4 . 
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which 
is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 (1968) (STEWART, J., 
concurring in result). Thus, children may not be able to 
protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to 
most adults, generally may 0e avoided by the unwilling 
through the exercise of ki,u~Jchoice. At the same 
time, such speech may have a deeper and more lasting 
negative effect on a child than an adult. For these 
reasons, society may prevent the general dissemination of 
such speech to children, leaving to parents the decision as 
to what speech of this kind their children shall hear and 
repeat: 
"[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently 
recognized that the parents' claim to authority 
in their own household to direct the rearing of 
their children is basic in the structure of our 
society. 'It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care, and nurture o( the child reside 
first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v. 
Massachusetts, [321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)]. The 
legislature could properly conclude that parents 
and others, teachers for example, who have this 
primary responsibility for children's well-being 
are entitled to the support of laws designed to 
aid discharge of that responsibility." 





properly held that the speech from which society may 
attempt to shield its children is not limited to that which 
appeals to the youthful prurient interest. The language 
involved in this case could be as potentially degrading and 
harmful to children as ~representations of many erotic 
acts. 
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind 
of speech to children may be limited without also limiting 
willing adults' access to it. Sellers of printed and 
recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live 
performances may be required to shut their doors to 
children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults' 
access. See Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 634-635. The 
difficulty is that such a physical separation of the 
audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media. 
During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and 
unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast 
audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults 
C1A_..~~~ 
without also reaching children. This, ~  1s one of the ~ 
distinctions between the broadcast and other media to which 
~ ~ 
e ~t often ..fTa-8 adverted as justifying a different 
.1\ 1\ 
treatment of the broadcast media for First Amendment 
6. 
purposes. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 
384 (1977); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-387 (1969); 
Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 
1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting 
Attorney General, 405 u.s. 1000 (1972); see generally 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503 
(1952). In my view, the Commission was entitled to give 
substantial weight to this difference in reaching its 
devision in this case. 
A second difference, not without relevance, is 
that broadcasting - unlike most other forms of 
communication - comes directly into the home, the one place 
where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted 
by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds. Erznoznik v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 u.s. 205, 209 (1975); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowen v. Post Office 
Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Although the First Amendment - ' 
may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of 
offensive but protected speech when they are in public 
before they turn away, see, ~' Erznoznik, supra, at 
210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 
903-909 (1972) (Powell, Jr., dissenting), a different order 
of values obtains in the home. "That we are often 
7 . 
'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to 
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must 
be captives everywhere." Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 
supra, at 738. The Commission also was entitled to give 
this factor appropriate weight in the circumstances of the 
instant case. This is not to say, ho~ever, that the 
Commission has an unrestricted license to decide what 
speech, protected in other media, may be banned from the 
airwaves in order to protect unwilling adults from 
momentary exposure to it in their homes.~/ Making the 
sensitive judgments required in these cases is not easy. 
But this responsibility has been reposed initially in the 
Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect. 
It is argued that despite society's right to 
protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite 
everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive 
speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case 
is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from 
listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the early 
afternoon hours. It is said that this ruling will have the 
effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population ... to 
[hearing] only what is fit for children." Butler v. 
Michigan, 352 u.s. 380, 383 (1957). This argument is not 
without force. The Commission certainly should consider it 
as it develops standards in this area. But it is not 
8 . 
sufficiently strong to leave 
act in circumstances such as those in this case. 
The Commission's holding does not prevent 
adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending 
performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript 
reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion. On its 
face, it does not prevent respondent from broadcasting the 
monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are 
likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting 
discussions of the contemporary use of language at any time 
during the day. The Commisoion's holding, and certainly 
the Court's holding today, does not speak to cases 
involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word 
in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from 
the linguistic shock treatment administered by respondent 
here. In short, I agree that on the facts of this case, 
the Commission's order did not violate respondent's First 
Amendment rights. 
J: ike~t. o~t. --:r;..., tltJ- pot- ·fkJ .f "is of•.M.io~ 
As the forego~demonstrates, l-~ t:ee- w±-nrill1Jc l1 
- is said in part rVJ of MR. JUSTICE. STE~l~ ) pinion. 
See ante, at 22-26. I do not join par , owever, 
because I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices 
of this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of 
its content which speech protected by the First Amendment 
is most "valuable" and hence deserving of the most 
protection, and which is less "valuable" and hence 
deserving of less protection. Compare ante, at 18-22; 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63-73 
(1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73 n.l 
(POWELL, J., concurring) .l/ In my view, the result in 
this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue, 
9 . 
viewed as a whole, or the words that comprise it, have more 
or less "value" than a candidate's campaign speech. This 
is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the 
~ 
judges to impose upon him. 
The result turns instead on the unique 
characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with 
society's right to protect its children from speech 
generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years, and 
~i~y with the interest of unwilling adults in not 
being assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes. 
Moreover, I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any 
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's 
own words from doing so, and from making for himself a 
value judgment as to the merit of the message and words. 
Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S., at 77-79 
(POWELL, J., concurring). These are the grounds upon which 
I join the judgment of the Court as to part IV. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughtful 
opinion in the Court of Appeals. u . S • App. , at 
, 556 F.2d, at 32-35 (Leventhal, J~ dissenting). 
2. It is true that the radio listener quickly may 
tune out speech that is offensive to him. In addition, 
broadcasters may preface programs with warnings as to their 
content. But such warnings do not help the unsuspecting 
listener who tunes in at the middle of a program. In this 
respect, too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and 
records, which may carry warnings on their faces, and from 
motion pictures and live performances, which may carry 
r ~ 
w~ings on their mar*uees. 
3. The Court has, however, created a limited 
exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech 
within the protection of the First Amendment. See Ohralik 
v. Ohio State Bar Association, u.s. (1978). 
~ 
4. For )fhe same reason, I also do not join part IV(a). 
As MR. JUSTICE STEVENS points out, ante, at 6, the Commission's 
order was limited to the facts of this case; "it did not 
purport to engage in formal rulemaking or in the promulgation 
of any regulations." In addition, since I tellf'~t the 
Commissio~p ~~le RI&Rfter ift the 
~' as it has in the past, cf. Brief for Petitioner 42-43, 
I do not foresee an undue "chilling" effect on broadcasters' 
exercise of their rights. {g;~;::;~:-~ 
t/L_) ~ .------_,. respondent's overbreadth challengeAmuet f&i • ~ 
Fer the reasons s tateej tn the tilxfii, supra, smJe'J"C:r::t_ ~ Qe.. 
~t.;:f the 
not~  that/application vel ~ of overbreadth analysis 
should depend on the Court's judgment as to the value of the 
protected speech that might be deterred. See ante, at 
14-15. Except in the context of commercial speech, &e~ 
see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-381 (1977), 
it has not in the past. See,~, Lewis v. New Orleans, 
415 u.s. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE W>< . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR. 
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~ag~ 19. Q}. 211~'1<~ 
June 19, 1978 
/ 
RE: No. 77-528 F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation 
Dear John: 
I'll probably join Potter but I'll also be writing 
something on the constitutional question. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
June 20, 1978 I 
Re: No. 77-528 - FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 














· I am gJad to jo:in you in my concurring opi.nion, 
and to make the tchanges you suggest. 
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June 20, 1978 
No. 77-528 FCC v. Pacifica Foundatio~ 
Dear Harry: 
I am glad to join you in my concurring opinion, 
and to make the changes you suggest. 
In view of the situation in the print shop, I 
wi.ll not recirculate for this purpose. The changes will 
be made in the first printed draft. 
Sincerely, 














1":·· .. ··~ 
•. ;-:: ,. 
'i~~ ., ' ...... •' .. .. .. •c 














. ~ . 
. . 
~-~ .. ,. 
r-Io~ 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~Um.t Qfltltrl ltf t!rt ~niftb ~htttg 
Jl'ultittgbm. ~. <If. 2ll~,., 
June 20, 1978 
Re: No. 77-528 - FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 
Dear Lewis: 
I appreciate your letting me climb aboard in this case. 
I am in no position to bargain, but the two minor suggestions I 
have are: 
1. That on page 4 of the typed draft, 12th line, the 
word 11 judicious 11 be eliminated. I suspect adults have a choice 
whether it is or is not judicious. 
2. That the citation to Carey appearing on the first 
three lines of page 5 be omitted. You do have the solid quota-
tion from Ginsberg there. And, as you know, I was on the other 
side in Carey. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,ju:puntt QI01tri ~f Urt ~tth ~httts 
~-lfittghnt. ~. QI. 2llP:'!.;J 
PERSONAL 
June 20, 1978 
i?..c.c.il •• ~ 
S. S'c Ptw. 
~ '/~.t.o 
Re: 77-528 - FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 
Dear Lewis: 
Because you indicated that you might be able 
to join portions of Part IV, I have broken it into 
three subsections. I think everything with which 
you took issue is in subpart B (which includes 
pages 18 thru 22 of the typed draft). 
To a certain extent the review of overbreadth 
analysis in subpart A rests on the premise that 
this speech is not very important and therefore 
your problems with subpart B may carry over to sub-
part A as well. Nevertheless, I would hope that you 
would at least think about joining subpart A because 
it is an important part of the picture. ~ believe, 
also, that it is consistent with the analysis in 
Harry's opinion in Bates. 
Some of my changes are the product of further 
thinking prompted by your concurrence, but I do not 
mean to take issue with anything you have said and 
will welcome any suggestions you care to make not-
withstanding our rather narrow area of disagreement. 
Thank goodness we are at last on the horne 
stretch. 
Respectfully, 
cc: Mr. Justice Blackrnun 
),;(_ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
J..fp/ss 6/19/78 
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Mr. Justice Stewart: 
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Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
.Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr.· Justice PowBll 
Circulated: ~ 
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No. 77-528, ~ v. Pacifica Foundation 
MR. JUSTICE POWE~~ concurring. o."'d IV(c:.) 
I join parts I, "'J[ ~ III of MR. JUS'riCE 
) -···;~-- ) 
STEVENS' opinion.w+z~~~ !e&er~i~~ The Court today 
reviews only the Commission's holding that Carlin's 
monologue was indecent "as broadcast" at two o'clock in th e 
afternoon, and not the broad sweep of the Commission's 
opinion. Ante, atli! ~ 1~ In addition to being 
consistent with our settled practice of not deciding 
constitutional issues unnecessarily, see ante, atll~ 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 
345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), this narrow focus 
also is conducive to the orderly development of this 
relatively new and difficult area of law, in the first 
instance by the Commission, and then by the reviewing 
courts. See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, U.S. App. 
D.C. , 556 F. 2d 9, 35-37 (1977) (Leventhal, 
J., dissenting). 
2. 
I also agree with much that is said in part IV of 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its conclusion that 
the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the 
First Amendment. Because I do not subscribe to all that is 
said in part IV, however, I state my views separately. 
I 
It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is 
not obscene in the constitutional sense. See 56 F.C.C.2d 
94, (1975); Brief for Petitioner 18. Nor, in this 
context, does its language c:onstitute "fighting words" 
within the meaning of Chaplins~v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942). Some of the words used have been held 
protected by the First Amendment in other cases and 
contexts. ~~' Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); 
Hess v. Indiana, 414 u.s. 105 (1973); Papish v. University 
of Missouri, 410 u.s. 667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15 (1971); see also Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 
697 (1974). I do not think Carlin, consistently with the : " 
First Amendment, could be punished for delivering the same 
monologue to a live audience composed of adults who, 
knowing what to expect, chose to attend his performance. 
See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (POWELL, J., 
concurring in result). And I would assume that an adult 
could not constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a 
recording or transcript of the monologue and playing or 
reading it in the privacy of his own home. Cf. Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
3. 
But it also is true that the language employed is, 
to most people, vulgar and offensive. It was chosen 
specifically for this quality, and it was repeated over and 
over as a sort of linguistic shock treatment. The 
Commission did not err in characterizing the narrow 
category of language used here as "patently offensive" to 
most people regardless of age. It was at least wholly 
without taste. 
The issue, however, is whether the Commission may 
impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for 
broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the 
afternoon. The Commission's primary concern was to prevent 
the broadcast from reaching the ears of unsupervised 
children who were likely to be in the audience at that 
hour. In essence, the Commission sought to "zone" the 
monologue to hours when the fewest unsupervised children , ~ 
would be exposed to it. See 56 F.C.C.2d, at In my 
view, this consideration provides strong support for the 
Commission's holding.l/ 
The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt 
more stringent controls on communicative materials 
available to youths than on those available to adults~" 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 u.s. 205, 212 
(1975); see also,~, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 
36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
636-643 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 u.s. 184, 195 
(1964)(opinion of BRENNAN, J.). This recognition stems in 
large part from the fact that "a child . . . is not 
4 . 
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice whic h 
is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 (1968) (STEWART, J., 
concurring in result). Thus, children may not be able to 
protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to 
most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling 
through the exercise of ~tldieie~choice. At the same 
time, such speech may have a deeper and more lasting 
negative effect on a child than an adult. For these 
reasons, society may prevent the general dissemination of 
such speech to children, leaving to parents the decision as 
to what speech of this kind their children shall hear and 
repeat: 
"fC)onstitutional interpretation has consistently 
recognized that the parents' claim to authority 
in their own household to direct the rearing of 
their children is basic in the structure of our 
society. 'It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside 
first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v. 
Massachusetts, [321 u.s. 158, 166 (1944)]. The 
legislature could properly conclude that parents 
and others, teachers for example, who have this 
primary responsibility for children's well-being 
are entitled to the support of laws designed to 
aid discharge of that responsibility." 
5 • 
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639o eee al--so C~ v .. ,__ 
}2.gfH 1 at iOfl-~v i.c..es-I-FH=e-t:= nat i o~l U.S. 6 7 8 , 7~ 
H:977) (PGWELL, J., cm~--4:-ftg in part~_The Commission 
properly held that the speech from which society may 
attempt to shield its children is not limited to that which 
appeals to the youthful prurient interest. The language 
involved in this case could be as potentially degrading and 
harmful to children as ~representations of many erotic 
acts. 
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind 
of speech to children may be limited without also limiting 
willing adults' access to it. Sellers of printed and 
recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live 
performances may be requiied to shut their doors to 
children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults' 
access. See Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 634-635. The 
difficulty is that such a physical separation of the 
audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media. 
During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and 
unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast 
audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults 
A.<; i-ke,_ Coa.rt €"""- ~ec..si :z.~ 
without also reaching children. Th1s, is one of the 
distinctions -between the broadcast and other media to which 
.ehe S&~~ten l>ltfa~';?erted as justifying a different 
treatment of the broadcast media for First Amendment 







purposes. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 35 C 
384 (1977); Columbia Broa dca s ting Sy s tem, Inc. v. 
Democr at ic Nationa l Committee, 412 u.s. 94, 101 (1973); ge e 
Lion Broa dcasting Co. v. FCC, 39j U.S. 367, 386-387 (1969); 
Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 
1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting 
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); see g e nerally 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 u.s. 495, 502-503 
(1952) . In my view, the Commission was entitled to give 
substantial weight to . this difference in reaching its 
decision in this case. 
A second difference, not without relevance, is 
that broadcasting - unlike most other forms of 
communication - comes directly into the home, the one place 
where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted 
by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds. Erznoznik v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowen v. Post Office 
Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Although the First Amendment 
may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of 
offensive but protected speech when they are in public 
before they turn away, see, ~, Erznoznik, supra, at 
210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 
903-909 (1972} (~, J~, dissenting), a different order 
of values obtains in the home. "That we are often 
7. 
'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to 
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must 
be captives everywhere." Rowan v. Post Of fice Dept., 
supra, at 738. The Commission also was e 'ntitled to give 
this factor appropriate weight in the circumstances of the 
instant case. This is not to say, however, that the 
Commission has an unrestricted license to decide what 
speech, protected in other media, may be banned from the 
airwaves in order to protect unwilling adults from 
n1omentary exposure to it in their homes .l/ Making the 
sensitive judgments required in these cases is not easy. 
But this responsibility has been reposed initially in t he 
Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect. 
It is argued that despite society's right to 
protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite 
everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive 
speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case 
is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from 
listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the early 
afternoon hours. It is said that this ruling will have the 
effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population ... to 
[hearing] only what is fit for children." Butler v. 
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). This argument is not 
without force. The Commission certainly should consider it 
as it develops standards in this area. But it is not 
8 . 
sufficiently strong to leave the Commission powerless to 
act in circumstances such as those in this case. 
The Commission's holding does not prevent willing 
adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending his 
performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript 
reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion. On its 
face, it does not prevent respondent from broadcasting the 
monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are 
likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting 
discussions of the contemporary use of language at any ti~e 
during the day. The Commission's holding, and certainly 
the Court's holding today, does not speak to cases 
involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word 
in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguishe d from 
the linguistic shock treatment administered by respondent 
here. In short, I agree that on the facts of this case, 
the Commission's order did not violate respondent's First 
Amendme nt rights. ~V\ y ~ :ewS aYe ~e.Kera..lly ;"'- a.C.C.or-J ; 
w;-t-~ wkt 
II 
~h6lcis s::dt:: ::::g~i;~~d::~n;::::::·STE~~}Jopinion. 
See ante, Qt!JS iil&, I do not join ~ pa wever, 
l<t- :ll· 
because I o not subscribe to the theory that the Justices 
of this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of 
its content which speech protected by the First Amendment 
----------------------------------------------------
]: tke.v--e.for-e_. jo;" t-ko..t porftok. of hi'S Of;~-t/o~. 
is most "valuable" and h~nce deserving of the most 
protection, and which is less "valuable" and hence 
deserving of less protection. Compare ante, a~ 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 u.s. ·so, 63-73 
(1976) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73 n.l 
(POWELL, J., concurring) .l/ In my view, the result in 
this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue, 
9. 
viewed as a whole, or the words that comprise it, have more 
or less "value" than a candidate's campaign speech. This 
is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the 
9:.1 
judges to impose upon him. 
The result turns instead on the unique 
characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with 
society's right to protect its children from speech 
generally agreed to be inappropri.ate for their years, and 
.eeeeooafo~ with the interest of umvilling adults in not 
being assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes. 
Moreover, I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any 
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's 
own words from doing so, and from making for himself a 
value judgment as to the merit of the message and words. 
Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S., at 77-79 
(POWELL, J., concurring). These are the grounds upon which 
I join the judgment of the Court as to part IV. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughtful 
o~~nion in the Court of Appeals. U . S . App . , at 
, 556 F.26, at 32-35 (Leventhal, J~ dissenting). 
2. It is true that the radio listener quickly may 
tune out speech that is offensive to him. In addition, 
broadcasters may preface programs with warnings as to their 
content. But such warnings do not help the unsuspecting 
listener who tunes in at the middle of a program. In this 
respect, too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and 
records, which may carry warnings on their faces, and from 
motion pictures and live performances, which may carry 
r cy 
wtings on their mar*uees .. 
3. The Court has, however, created a limited 
exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech 
within the protection of the First Amendment. See Ohralik 
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4. For much the same reason, I also do not join 
part IV(a). As MR. JUSTICE STEVENS points out, ante, at 
6, the Commission's order was limited to the facts of this 
case~ "it did not purport to engage in formal rulemaki ng 
or in the promulgation of any regulations." In addition, 
since the Commission may be expected to proceed 
cautiously, as it has in the past, cf. Brief for 
Petitioner 42-43, I do not foresee an undue "chilling" 
effect on broadcasters' exercise of their rights. I 
agree, therefore, that respondent's overbreadth challenge 
is meritless. 
I had not thought that the application vel non of 
overbreadth analysis should depend on the Court's judgment 
as to the value of the protected speech that might be 
deterred. See ante, at 14-15. Except · in the context of 
commercial speech, see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
u.s. 350, 380-381 (1977), it has not in the past. See, 
~, Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S . 130 (1974) ~ Gooding 
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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
/ , 
I agree with MR. JUSTICE STEWART that, under Hamling 
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), and United States v. 
12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (i.973), the word 
~ 
"indecent" in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 must be construed to 
prohibit only obscene speech. I would, therefore, 
normally refrain from expressing my views on any 
constitutional issues implicated in this case. However, I 
find the Court's misapplication of fundamental First 
Amendment principles so patent, and its attempt to impose 
) 
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-
its ~y myopic notions of propri~~on the whole of the 
American people so misguided, that I am unable to remain 
silent. 
I 
For the second time in two years, see Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Court 
refuses to embrace the notion, completely antithetical to 
basic First Amendment values, that the degree of 
protection the First Amendment affords protected speech 
varies with the social value ascribed to that speech by 
five members of this Court. See Opinion of MR. JUSTICE 
I, 
POWELL, ante, at Moreover, as do all parties, all 
members of the Court agree that the Carlin monologue aired 
by Station WBAI does not fall within one of the categories 
of speech, such as "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 u.s. 568 (1942), or obscenity, Roth v. 
United States,. 354 u.s. 476 (1957), that is totally 
without First Amendment protection. This conclusion, of 
course, is compelled by our cases expressly holding that 
communications containing some of the words found 
sanctionable here are fully protected by the First 
Amendment in other contexts. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 
415 U.S. 697 (1974); Papish v. University of Missouri 
,.; ./' . 
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Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 
914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); 
Rosenfield v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Yet despite the Court's 
refusal to create a sliding scale of First Amendment 
protection calibrated to this Court's perception of the 
worth of a communication's content, and despite our 
unanimous agreement that the Carlin monologue is protected 
speech, a majority of the Court!/ nevertheless finds 
that, on the facts of this case, the FCC is not 
constitutionally barred from imposing sanctions on 
I, 
Pacifica for its airing of the Carlin monologue. This 
majority apparently believes that the FCC's disapproval of 
Pacifica's afternoon broadcast of Carlin's "Dirty Words" 
recording is a permissible time, place, and manner 
regulation. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Both 
the opinion of my Brother STEVENS and the opinion of my 
Brother POWELL rely principally on two factors in reaching 
this conclusion: (1) the capacity of a radio broadcast to 
1/ Where I critically refer undifferentiatingly to 
the ictions of "the Court," my reference is to this 
majority, which consists of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS 
and those members of the Court joining their separate 
opinions. 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Di ssen t (BRENNAN, J.) 
Page 4 
intrude into the unwilling listener's home, and (2) the 
presence of children in the listening audience . 
Dispassionate analysis , r emoved from individual notions as 
to what is proper and what is not, starkly reveals that 
~""-""'--""' 
these justifications, whether individ ually or together, 
simply do not suppor t even the professedly moderate degree 
of governmental homogenization of radio 
communications--if, indeed, such homogenization can ever 
be moderate given the pr eem inent status of the right of 




Without question, the privacy interests of an 
individual in his home are substantial and deserving of 
significant protection. In finding these interests 
sufficient to justify the content regulation of protected 
speech, however, the Court commits two errors. First, it 
misconceives the nature of the privacy interests involved 
where an individual voluntarily chooses to admit radio 
communications into his home . Second, it ignores the 
constitutionally protected interests of both those who 
wish to transmit and those who desire to receive 
broadcasts that many--including the FCC and this 
Court--might find offensive. 
_, ./' . 
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"The abi lity of government , consonant with the 
Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect 
others from hearing it is . dependent upon a showing 
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an 
essentially intolerable manner . Any broader view of this 
authority would effectively empower a majority to silence 
dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections. " 
Cohen v. California, supra , at 21. I am in wholehearted 
agreement with my brethren that an individual's right "to 
be let alone " when engaged in private activity within the 
confines of his own home is encompassed within the 
'· 
"substantial privacy interests" to which Mr. Justice 
Harlan referred in Cohen, and is entitled to the greatest 
solicitude. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
However, I believe that an individual's actions in 
switching on and listening to communications transmitted 
over the public airways and directed to the public 
at-large does not implicate fundamental privacy interests, 
even when engaged in within the home. Instead, because 
the radi o is undeniably a public medium, these actions are 
more properly viewed as a decision to take part, if only 
as a listener, in an ongoing public discourse. See Note, 
Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Dissent (BRENNAN, J.) 
Page 6 
Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 Va. L. Rev. 579, 618 
(1975). Although an individual's decision to allow public 
radio communications into his horne undoubtedly does not 
abrogate all of his privacy interests, the residual 
privacy interests he retains vis-a-vis the communication 
he voluntarily admits into his horne are surely no greater 
than those of the people present in the corridor of the 
Los Angeles courthouse in Cohen who bore witness to the 
words "Fuck the Draft" emblazoned across Cohen's jacket. 
Their privacy interests were held insufficient to justify 
punishing Cohen for his offensive communication. 
'· 
Even if an individual who voluntarily opens his horne 
to radio communications retains privacy interests of 
sufficient moment to justify a ban on protected speech if 
those interests are "invaded in an essentially intolerable 
manner," Cohen v. California, supra, at 21, the very fact 
that those interests are threatened only by a radio 
broadcast of itself precludes the latter condition from 
being satisfied; for unlike other intrusive modes of 
communication, such as sound trucks, "[t]he radio can be 
turned off," Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 
298, 302 (1974)--and with a rninirnun of effort . As Judge 
Bazelon aptly observed below, "having elected to receive 
J •• ~ 
f 
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public air waves, the scanner who stumbles onto an 
offensive program is in the same position as the 
unsuspecting passers-by in Cohen and Erznoznik [v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)]; he can avert his 
attention by changing channels or turning off the set." 
Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 26 (CADC 1977). 
Whatever the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who 
inadvertently tunes into a program he finds offensive 
during the brief interval before he can simply extend his 
arm and switch stations or flick the "off" botton, it is 
surely worth the candle to preserve the broadcaster's 
I. 
right to send, and the right of those interested to 
receive, a message entitled to full First Amendment 
protection. To reach a contrary balance, as does the 
Court, is clearly, to follow MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' reliance 
on animal metaphors, ante at 21, "to burn the house to 
I 
roast the pig." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 
(1957). 
The Court's balance, of necessity, fails to accord 
proper weight to the interests of listeners who wish to 
hear broadcasts the FCC deems offensive. It permits 
majoritarian tastes completely to preclude a protected 
message from entering the homes of a receptive, unoffended 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Dissent (BRENNAN, J.) 
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minority. No decision of this Court supports such a 
result. Where the individuals comprising the offended 
majority may freely choose to reject the materia~ being 
offered, we have never found their privacy interests of 
such moment to warrant the suppression of speech on 
privacy grounds. Compare Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights, supra. Rowan v. Post Office Departme nt, 397 U.S. 
728 (1970), relied on by the FCC and by the opinions of my 
Brothers POWELL and STEVENS, confirms rather than belies 
this conclusion. In Rowan, the Court upheld a statute, 39 
u.s.c. § 4009, permitting householders to require that 
I . 
mail advertisers stop sending them lewd or offensive 
materials and remove their names from mailing lists. 
Unlike the situation here, householders who wished to 
receive the sender's communications were not prevented 
from doing so. Equally important, the determination of 
offensiveness vel non under the statute involved in Rowan 
was completely within the hands of the individual 
householder; no governmental evaluation of the worth of 
the mail's content stood between the mailer and the 
householder. In contrast, the visage of the censor is all 
too discernable here. 
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B 
Most parents will undoubtedly find understandable as 
well as commendable the Court's ~ sympathy with the FCC 's 
desire to prevent offensive broadcasts from reaching the 
ears of unsupervised children. Unfortunately, the facial 
appeal of this justification for radio censorship masks 
its constitutional insufficiency. Although the government 
unquestionably has a special interest in the well-being of 
children and consequently "can adopt more stringent 
controls on communicative materials available to youths 
than on those available to adults," Erznoznik v. City of 
I , 
Jacksonville, supra, at 212, see Paris Adult Theatre I v. 
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-107 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting) , the Court has accounted for this societal 
interest by adopting a "variable obscenity" standard that 
permits the purient appeal of material available to 
children to be assessed in terms of ~he sexual interests 
of minors. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). It 
is true that the obscenity standard the Ginsberg Court 
adapted for such materials was based on the 
then-applicable obscenity standard of Roth v. United 
States, supra, and Memoirs v. Massachussetts, 383 U.S. 413 
(1966), and that "[w)e have not had occasion to decide 
FCC v. Pa cifica Found a tion: Di sse nt (BRENNAN, J.) 
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what effect Miller [v. California, 413 u.s. 15 (1973)] 
will have on the Ginsberg formulation." Erznoznik v. City 
of Jacksonville·, supra, at 213 n .10. Nevertheless, we 
have made it abundantly clear that "under any test of 
obscenity as to minors .•. to be obscene 'such 
expression must be, in some significant way, erotic.' 
Cohen v. California, 403 u.s. 15, 20 (1971) ." Ibid. 
Because the Carlin monologue is obviously not an 
erotic appeal to the prurient interests of children, the 
Court, for the fir s t time, allows the government to 
prevent minors from gaining access to materials that are 
I, 
not obscene, and are therefore protected, as to them.~/ 
It thus ignores our recent admonition that "[s]peech that 
is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other 
legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to 
protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative 
2/ Even if the monologue appealed to the purient 
interest of minors, it would not be obscene as to them 
unless, as to them, "the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value." Miller v. California, 413 u.s. 15, 24 (1973). 
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body thinks unsuitable for them." rd., at 213-214.2/ 
The Court's refusal to follow its own pronouncements is 
especially lamentable since it has the anomalous 
subsidiary effect, at least in the radio context at i ss ue 
here, of making completely unavailable to adults material 
which may not constitutionally be kept even from 
children. This result violates the principle of Butler v. 
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) in spades. Butler involved 
a challenge to a Michigan statute that forbade the 
publication , sale, or distribution of printed material 
"tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or 
'· 
immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the 
morals of youth." Id., at 381. Although Roth v. United 
States, supra, had not yet been decided, it is at least 
arguable that the material the stautue in Butler was 
designed to suppress constitutionally could have been 
3/ It may well be that a narrowly drawn regulation 
prohibiting the use of offensive language on broadcasts 
directed specifically at younger children constitutes one 
of the "other legitimate proscription[s]" alluded to in 
Erznoznik. This is so both because of the difficulties 
inherent in adapting the Miller formulation to 
communications received by young children, and because 
such children are "not possessed of that full capacity for 
individual choice which is the presupposition of the First 
Amendment guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 
629 , 649-650 (1968) (STEWART, J., concurring). 
J •• ~ . 
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denied to children. Nevertheless, this Court found the 
statute unconstitutional. Speaking for the Court, Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter reasoned; 
"The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the 
adul t population of Michigan to reading only what is 
fit for children. It thereby arbitrarily curtails one 
of those liberties of the individual, now enshrined in 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
that history has attested as the indispensable 
conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free 
society." Butler v. Michigan, supra, at 383-384. 
Where, as here, the government may not prevent the 
exposure of minors to the suppressed material, the 
principle of Butler applies ~ fortiorari. The opinion of 
my Brother POWELL acknowledges that there lurks in the '· 
today's decision a potential for "'reduc[ing] the adult 
population •.. to [hearing] only what is fit for 
children,'" ante at , but expresses faith that the FCC 
will vigilently prevent this potential from ever becoming 
a reality. I am far less certain than my Brother POWELL 
that such faith in the Commission is warranted, see 
Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 
F.2d 397, 418-421 (Statement of Bazelon, C.J., as to why 
he voted to grant rehearing en bane); and even if I shared 
it, I could not so easily shirk the responsibility assumed 
by each member of this Court with the donning of his robes 
; ./ 
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jealously to guard against encroachments on First 
Amendme nt freedoms. 
In concluding that the p resence of children in the 
listening audience provides an adequate basis for the FCC 
to sanction Pacifica's broadcast of the Carlin monologue 
over radio, th e opinions of my Brother POWELL, ante at 
and my Brother STEVENS, ante at 20, both stress the 
time-honored right of a parent to raise his child as he 
sees fit--a right this Court has consistently been 
vigilent to protect. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 u.s. 205 
(1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 u.s. 510 
(1925). Yet this principle supports a result directly 
contrary to that reached by the Court. Yoder and Pierce 
hold that parents, net the government, have the right to 
make certain decis io~s regarding the upbringing of their 
child!e n. As sur pris:ng as it may be to individual 
members of this Court , some parents may actually find Mr. 
Carli n's unabashed attitude towards the seven "dirty 
words " healthy, and deem it desirable to expose their 
childr e n to the manner in which Mr. Carlin defuses the 
taboo surrounding the words. Such parents may constitute 
a minority of the Am e rican public, but the absence of 
great numbers willing to exercise the right to raise their 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Dissent (BRENNAN, J.) 
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children in thi s fashion does not alter the right's nature 
or its existence . Only the Court's regrettable decision 
does that.i/ 
c 
As demonstrated above, neither of the factors relied 
on by both the Opinion of my Brother POWELL and the 
Opinion of my Brothe r Stevens--the intrusive nature of 
radio and the presence of children in the listening 
audience--can, when taken on its own terms, support the 
FCC's disapproval of the Carlin monologue. These two 
asserted justifications are further plague d by a common 
II 
failing: the lack of principled limits on their use as a 
basis for FCC censorship. No such limits come readily to 
mind, and neither o f ~he opinions comprising the Court 
serve to clarify t t ~ ex tent to which the FCC may assert 
the ?ri vacy and ch i:~ren-in-the-audience rationales as 
just i::sation fo r ex?un ging from the airways protected 
4/ The opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS 
rightly refrain from r e lying on the notion of "spectrum 
scarcity " to suppor t their result. As Chief Judge Bazelon 
noted below, "although scarcity has justified increasing 
the diversity of spe akers and speech, it has never been 
held to justify c e ns orship." 556 F.2d at 29 (emphasis in 
original). See Re d Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 
367' 396 (1969) .- - -
I I 
I I 
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communic ations the Commission finds offensive. Taken to 
their l ogical extreme , these rationales would support the 
cleansing of public radio of any "four-letter" words 
whatsoever, regardless of their context. The rationales 
could justify the banning from radio of a myriad of 
literary works, novels, poems , and plays by the likes of 
Shakespeare, Joyce, Hemingway , Ben Jonson, Henry Fielding, 
Robert Burns, and Chaucer: they could support the 
suppression of a good deal of political speech, such as 
the Nixon tapes; and they could even provide the basis for 
sanctioning the broadca s t of certain portions of the Bible. 
In order to dispel the spectre of the possibility of 
so unpalatable a degree of censorship, and to defuse 
Pacifica ' s overbread~h challenge, the FCC insists that it 
desires only the a ut~or ity to reprimand a broadcaster on 
fac ts a nalogous t o those present in this case, which it 
de s c r:.:Je s as involving "broadcasting for nearly twelve 
minu tes a record which repeated over and over words which 
depict sexual or excretory activities and organs in a 
manner patently of fe nsive by its community ' s contemporary 
standards in the early afternoon when children were in the 
audience." Brief for the Federal Communications 
Commission 45. The opinions of both my Brother POWELL and 
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my Br other STEVENS take the FCC at it s word, and 
cons equently do no more than p ermi t the Commission to 
censor the afternoon broadcast of the "sort of lingui stic 
shock treatment," Opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, ante 
at , involved here. To insure that the FCC's 
regulation of protected speech does not exceed these 
bounds, my Brother POWELL is content to rely upon the 
judgment of the Commission while my Brother STEVENS deems 
it prudent to rely on this Court's ability accurately to 
assess the worth of various kinds of speech.~/ For my 
own part, even accepting that this case is limited to its 
~/ Although ultimately depende nt upon the outcome of 
review in this Court , the approach taken by my Brother 
STEVENS would not ap~?a r to tolerate the FCC's suppression 
of any speech, such as political speech, falling within 
the core area of Fi :st Amendment concern. The same, 
however , cannot b e s2id of the approach taken by my 
Bro ther POWE LL, which, on its face, permits the Commission 
to sa~c ~ion even political speech if it is sufficiently 
offe~e-to communi~! standards. A result more contrary 
to ruc~mentary Fir st Am endment principles is difficult to 
~imag ine . --------
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fact s,~/ I would place the responsibility and the right 
to weed worthless and offensive communications from the 
public airways wher e it belongs and where, until today, it 
resided; in a public free to choose those communications 
worthy of its attention from a marketplace unsullied by 
the censor's hand. 
II 
The absence of any hesitancy in the opinions of my 
Brothers POWELL and STEVENS to approve the FCC's 
censorship of the Carlin monologue on the basis of two 
demonstrably inadequate grounds is a function of their 
perception that the decision will result in little, if 
any, curtailment of communicative exchanges protected by 
~/ Having insis=ed that it seeks to sanction radio 
commun ications o nly 1~ the limited circumstances present 
her e, I believe that the FCC is estopped from using either 
this d~cision or its own orders in this case, 56 F.C.C.2d 
94 (1575 ), and 59 F.e.C .2d 892 (1976), as a basis for 
sanc tioni ng any public radio broadcast other than one 
air ed dur ing the daytime or early evening and containing 
the relentless repetition, for longer than a brief 
inter val , of "language that describes, in terms patently 
offensive as measu red by contemporary community standards 
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities 
and organs." 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 . For surely broadcasters 
are not now on notice that the Commission desires to 
regulate any offensive broadcast, other than the type of 
"linguistic shock treatment" condemned here, at any time, 
or even this shock treatment type of offensive broadcast 
during the late evening. 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Dissent (BRENNAN, J.) 
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the Fi rs t Amendm e nt. Although the extent to which the 
Court stands ready to countenance FCC censorship of 
protected speech is unclear from today's decision, I find 
the reasoning by which my Brethren conclude that the FCC 
censorship they approve will not significantly infringe on 
First Amendment values both disingenuous as to reality and 
wrong as a matter of law. 
My Brother STEVENS, in reaching a result 
apologetically described as narrow, ante, at 21, takes ---
comfort in his observation that "[a] requirement that -
indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect 
on the form, rather than the content, of serious 
communication," ante at 14 n.l8, and finds solace in his 
conviction that "[t )':er e are few, if any, thoughts that 
cannot be expresse c ~y the use of less offensive 
lang uage." Icl. T:::e idea that the content of a message 
and i~s potenti a l i~?act on any who might receive it can 
be di ~or ced from t he wor ds that are the vehicle for its 
expr essi on is transpa rently fallacious. A give n word may 
--------have a unique capac ity to capsule an idea, evoke an 
emotion, or conjure up an image. Indeed, for those of us 
who place an appropriately high value on our cherishe d 
First Amendment rights, the word "censor " is such a word. 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Dissent (BRENNAN, J. ) 
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Mr. Just ice Harlan, speaking for the Court , recognized the 
truism that a speake r ' s choice of words cannot surgically 
be separated from the ideas he desires to express when he 
warned that ''we cannot indulge the facile assumption that 
one can forbid particular words without also running a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.'' 
Cohen v. California, supra, at 26. Moreover, even if an 
alternative phrasing may communicate a speaker ' s abstract 
ideas as effectively as those words he is forbidden to 
use, it is doubtful that the sterilized message will 
convey the emotion that is an essential part of so many 
communications. This, too, was apparent to Mr. Justice 
Harlan and the Court in Cohen. 
''[W]e cannot ove=l ook the fact, because it is well 
illustrated by ~~e episode involved here, that much 
linguistic expres3ion serves a dual communicative 
function: it ccnveys not only ideas capable of 
r ela tively pr ecise , detached explication, but 
o t~erwise inexp~es sible emotions as well. In fact, 
word s are oft en c hosen as much for their emotive as 
t ~eir cogniti ve f o r ce. We cannot sanction the view 
t hat the Con bs t itu tion, while solicitous of the 
c ogn itive cont e n t of individual speech, has little or 
no regard for that emotive function which, practically 
spea king, may often be the more important element of 
the overall mes s age sought to be communicated." Id. 
at 25-26. 
My Brother STEVENS also finds relevant to his First 
Amendment analysis the fact that " [a]dults who feel the 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Dissent (BRENNAN, J.) 
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need ~~Y purchase tapes and records or go to theatres and 
nightclubs to hear [ the tabooed] words." Ante, at 21 
n.27. My Brother POWELL agrees: "The Commission's 
holding does not prevent willing adults from purchasing 
Carlin's record, from attending his performances, or, 
indeed, from reading the transcript reprinted as an 
appendix to the Court's opinion." Ante at The 
opinions of my Brethren display both a sad insensitivity 
to the fact that that these alternatives involve the 
expenditure of money, time, and effort that many of those 
wishing the hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able to 
afford, and a naive innocence of the reality that in many 
'-
c ases, the medium may well be the message. 
The Court appar e~ :ly believes that the FCC's actions 
here can be analog :zed to the zoning ordinances upheld in 
Young v . American ~i~i Theatres , supra. For two reasons, 
it is ~rong. Fir s~, ~he zoning ordinances found to pass 
const itut ional muster in ~oung had valid goals other than 
the ch a nneling of protected speech. Id. at 71 n.34 
(Opinion of STEVFNS, J .); id. at 80 (POWELL, J., 
concurring). No such goals are present here. Second, and 
crucial to the opinions of my Brothers POWELL and STEVENS 
in Young--opinions which, as they do in this case, supply 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Dissent (BRENNAN, J.) 
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the bare five-person majority of the Court--the ordinances 
did not restrict the access of distributors or exhibitors 
to the market or impair the viewing public's access to the 
regulated material. Id. at 62, 71 n.35 (Opinion of 
STEVENS, J.); id. at 77 (POWELL, J., concurring). Again, 
this is not the situation here. Both those desiring to 
receive Carlin's message over the radio and those wishing 
to send it to them are prevented from doing so by the 
Commission's actions. Although, as my Brethren point out, 
Carlin's message may be disseminated or received by other 
means, this is of little consolation to those broadcasters 
and listeners who, for a host of reasons, not least among 
them financial, do not have access to, or cannot take 
advantage of, these ot her means. 
Moreover, it i s dou btful that even those frustrated 
liste~e rs in a pos ition to follow my Brother POWELL"S 
gratu~ous advice a nd attend one of Carlin's performances 
or pur chase one of his records would receive precisely the 
same me ssage Pacifica's radio station sent its audience. 
The airways are capable not only of carrying a message, 
but also of transforming it. A satirist's monologue may 
be most potent when delivered to a live audience; yet the 
choice whether this will in fact be the manner in which 
the message is delivered and received is one the First 
Amendment prohibits the governme nt from making. 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Diss e nt (BRENNAN, J.) 
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III 
It is quite evident that I find the Court's attempt to 
unstitch the warp and woof of First Amendment law in an 
effort to reshape its fabric to cover the patently wrong 
result the Court reaches in this case dangerous as well as 
lamentable. Yet there runs throughout the opinions of my 
Brothers POWELL and STEVENS another vein I find equally 
disturbing: a depressing inability to appreciate that in 
our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, 
act, and talk differently from the members of this Court, 
and who do not share their ) fragile sensibilities J It is 
only an acute ethnoce ntric myopia that enables the Court 
to approve the censo!ship of communications solely because 
of the words they co~~ ain. 
''A word is not s crystal, transpa r ent and unchanged, 
it i s th e skin o f 2 _iv ing thought and may vary greatly in 
color 2nd content accor ding to the circumstances and the 
time in which it i s used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 
425 (19 18) (Holme s, J.). The words that the Court and the 
Commission find so unpalatable may be the stuff of 
everyday conversations in some, if not many, of the 
innumerable subcultures that comprise this Nation. 
Academic research indicates that this is indeed the case. 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Dissent (BRENNAN, J.) 
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See Jackson, Get Your Ass in the Water and Swim Like Me 
(1974); Dillard, Black English (1972); Labov, Language in 
the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular 
(1972). As one resea r ch e r concluded, "[w]ords generally 
considered obscene like 'bullshit' and 'fuck' are 
considered neither obscene nor derogatory in the [black] 
vernacular except in particular contextual situations and 
when used with certain intonations." Bins, "Toward an 
Ethnography of Contemporary African Ameri ca n Oral Poetry," 
Language and Linguistics Working Papers No. 5 (Georgetown 
University Press 1972). 
Today's decision will thus have its greatest impact on 
listening audiences compr ised of persons who do not share 
the Court's view as c~ which words or expressions are 
acceptable and who, fa: a variety of reasons, including a 
consc :~us desire t~ flout majoritarian conventions, 
expr es5 thems~lves using words that may be regarded as 
offens:ve by thos e from different socio-economic 
backgrounds, and on broadcasters desiring to reach such 
audiences.2/ In this context, the Court's decision may 
7/ Under the approach taken by my Brother POWELL, the 
avaiiability of b r oadcasts about groups whose members 
comprise such· aud iences might also be affected~ Both news 
broadcasts about activities involving these groups and 
public affairs broadcasts about their concerns are apt to 
contain interviews, statements , or remarks by group 
leaders and members which may contain offensive language 
to an extent my Brother POWELL finds unacceptable. 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Dis sent (BRENNAN, J.) 
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be s een for what, in the broader perspective, it really 
is: another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts 
to force those groups who do not share its mores to 
conform to its way of thinking, acting, and speaking. See 
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506-511 (1977) 
(BRENNAN, J., concur ring ). 
Pacifica, in response to an FCC inquiry about its 
broadcast of Carlin's satire on "the words you couldn't 
say on the public airwaves," explained that "Carlin is not 
mouthing obsceinties, he is merely using words to satirize 
as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards 
those words." 56 F.C.C.2d at In confirming Carlin's 
prescience as a soci al commentator by the result it 
reaches today, the Ccur t evinces an attitude towards the. 
"seven dirty wor ds" ::~at many others besides Mr. Carlin 
and Pacif ica mig ht cescribe as "silly". Whether today's 
deci sicn will simi larly prove "harmless" remains to be 
seen. One can on ly hope that it will. 
To: Mr. Justice Powell June 25, 1978 
From: Jim Alt 
Re: Justice Brennan's dissent in No. 77-528, FCC 
Pacifica Foundation. v. J;;-~ 
A.-b{_~ 
This dissent is intemperate in some places, smugly ~~~ 
self-righteous in others, and ludicrously overwritten in yet 
others. (,[&, the reference at page 22 to "the Court's attempt 
of 
to unstitch the warp and woof ,fFirst Amendment law in an effort 
to reshape its fabric to cover the patently wrong result the 
Court reaches • • . ") Analytically, however, it makes no 
points that I had not anticipated, and none that I deem 
worthy of reply. 
There are a few small changes I ~~yld propose making in 
your opinion before it goes to press~First, I would 
~ change the phrase "linguistic shock treatment" at pages 3 and 
8 to "verbal shock treatment." It is a bit less graceless, and 
may convey the thought more accurately. 
Second, I would delete the sentence at page 3 that states: ~,1 
"It [Carlin's monologue] was at least wholly without taste." 
~ In part II you eschew making a value judgment on Carlin's monologue, 




e portion of the paragraph preceding this sentence is put in 
terms of what "most people" would think, while this sentence seems 
to express your own personal view. Basically, I think the opinion 
is stronger without the sentence than with it. ~ .IZ.o 1 ~ 
Third, also at page 3, I would change the word "zone" to 
:n C.l.. .. qP4 aA.€ --~eJ ~ ~ 
(A>'' 1 cr...v , .... ;.,,J ·94.. 
I 
"channel," to conform with the language used by the FCC and 
in Justice Stevens' opinion. 
Fourth_, . I would change the sentence at page 5 that reads, 
"The language involved in this case could be as potentially 
degrading and harmful to children" to say that the language 
2. 
"is as potentially degrading and harmful." Otherwise, the sentence 
contains a double qualification. 
Finally, I would rearrange the paragraphs that comprise 
the text of note 4 as indicated in the attached copy, which seems 
to me more logical. 
* * 
After re-reading the three opinions in this case that 
deal with the constitutional issue, I would immodestly venture 










No. 77-528, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
joins, concurring. 
I join parts I, II, III and IV(c) of MR. JUSTICE 
STEVENS' opinion. The Court today reviews only the 
Commission's holding that Carlin's monologue was indecent 
"as broadcast" at two o'clock in the afternoon, and not the 
broad sweep of the Commission's opinion. Ante, at 6. In 
addition to being consistent with our settled practice of 
not deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily, see ante, 
at 6; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 u.s. 
288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), this narrow 
focus also is conducive to the orderly development of this 
relatively new and difficult area of law, in the first 
instance by the Commission, and then by the reviewing 
courts. See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, U.S. App. 
D.C. 556 F. 2d 9, 35-37 (1977) (Leventhal, 
J., dissenting). 
- " . 
2. 
I also agree with much that is said in part IV of 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion, and with its condlusion that 
the Commission's holding in this case does not violate the 
First Amendment. Because I do not subscribe to all that is 
said in part IV, however, I state my views separately. 
I 
It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is 
not obscene in the constitutional sense . . See 56 F.C.C.2d 
94, (1975): Brief for Petitioner 18. Nor, in this 
context, does its language constitute "fighting words" 
within the meaning of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 u.s. 
568 (1942). Some of the words used have been held 
protected by the First Amendment in other cases and 
contexts. ~, Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 u.s. 130 (1974): 
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Papish v. University 
of Missouri, 410 u·.s. 667 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 
u.s. 15 (1971); see also Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 
697 (1974). I do not think Carlin, consistently with the 
First Amendment, could be punished for delivering the same ; " 
monologue to a live audience composed of adults who, 
knowing what to expect, chose to attend his performance. 
See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972) (POWELL, J., 
concurring in result). And I would assume that an adult 
could not constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a 
recording or transcript of the monologue and playing or 
reading it in the privacy of his own home. Cf. Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
3. 
But it also is true that the language employed is, 
to most people, vulgar and offensive. It was chosen 
specifically for this quality, and it was repeated over and 
I over as a sort of verbal shock treatment. The Commission 
did not err in characterizing the narrow category of 
language used here as "patently offensive" to most people 
I regardless of age. 
The issue, however, is whether the Commission may 
impose civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for 
broadcasting the monologue at two o'clock in the 
afternoon. The Commissibn's primary concern was to prevent 
the broadcast from reaching the ears of unsupervised 
children who were likely to be in the audience at that 
I hour. In essence, the ComiT)ission sought to "channel" the 
monologue to hours when the fewest unsupervised children 
would be exposed to it. See 56 F.C.C.2d, at In my 
view, this consideration provides strong support for th~ ' 
Commission's holding.ll 
The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt 
more stringent controls on communicative materials 
available to youths than on those available to adults." 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 
4. 
(1975); see also,~, Miller v. California, 413 u.s. 15, 
36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
636-643 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 
(1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). This recognition stems in 
large part from the fact that "a child ... is not 
possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which 
is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 (1968) (STEWART, J., 
concurring in result). Thus, children may not be able to 
protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to 
most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling 
through the exercise of choice. At the same time, such 
speech may have a deeper and more lasting negative effect 
on a child than an adult. For these reasons, society may 
prevent the general dissemination of such speech to 
children, leaving to parents the decision as to what speech 
of this kind their ch~ldren shall hear and repeat: · 
"[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently 
recognized that the parents' claim to authority , 
; in their own household to direct the rearing of 
their chil.dren is basic in the structure of our 
society. 'It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside 
first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v. 
Massachusetts, [321 u.s. 158, 166 (1944)]. The 
legislature coul.d properly conclude that parents 
and others, teachers for example, who have this 
primary responsibility for children's well-being 
are entitled to the support of l.aws designed to 
aid discharge of that responsibility." 
5 • 
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639. The Commission 
properly held that the speech from which society may 
attempt to shield its children is not limited to that which 
appeals to the youthful prurient interest. The language 
, . invoJ.ved in this case is as potentially degrading and 
harmful to children as representations o: many erotic 
acts. 
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind 
of speech to children may be limited without also limiting 
willing adults' access to it. Sellers of printed and 
recorded matter and exhibitors of motion pictures and live 
performances may be required to shut their doors to 
children, but such a requirement has no effect on adults' 
access. See Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 634-635. The 
difficulty is that such a physical separation of the 
audience cannot be accomplished in the broadcast media. 
During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and 
unsupervised children are likely to be in the broadcast 
audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults 
without also reaching children. This, as the Court 
emphasizes, is one of the distinctions between the 
broadcast and other media to which we often have adverted 
as justifying a different treatment of the broadcast media 
for First Amendment 
6. 
purposes. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 
384 (1977); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-387 (1969); 
Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 
1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting 
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); see generally 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wjlson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503 
(1952). In my view, the Commission was entitled to give 
substantial weight to this difference in reaching its 
decision in this case. 
A second difference, not without relevance, is 
that broadcasting - unlike most other forms of 
communication - comes directly into the home, the one place 
where people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted 
by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds. Erznoznik v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 u.s. 205, 209 (1975); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Rowen v. Post Office 
Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Although the First Amendment 
may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of 
offensive but protected speech when they are in public 
before they turn away, see, ~, Erznoznik, supra, at 
210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 u.s. 901, 
903-909 (1972) (POWELL, J., dissenting), a di.fferent order 
of values obtains in the home. "That we are often 
7. 
'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to 
objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must 
be captives everywhere." Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 
supra, at 738. The Commission also was entitled to give 
this factor appropriate weight in the circumstances of the 
instant case. This is not to say, •however, that the 
Commission has an unrestricted license to decide what 
speech, protected in other media, may be banned from the 
airwaves in order to protect unwilling adults from 
momentary exposure to it in their homes.l/ Making the 
sensitive judgments required in these cases is not easy. 
But this responsibility has been reposed initially in the 
Commission, and its judgment is entitled to respect. 
It is argued that despite society's right to 
protect its children from this kind of speech, and despite 
everyone's interest in not being assaulted by offensive 
speech in the home, the Commission's holding in this case 
is impermissible because it prevents willing adults from 
; " 
listening to Carlin's monologue over the radio in the early 
afternoon hours. It is said that this ruling will have the 
effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population ... to 
[hearing] only what is fit for children." Butler v. 
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). This argument is not 
without force. The Commission certainly should consider it 
as it develops standards in this area. But it is not 
8. 
sufficiently strong to leave the Commission powerless .to 
act in circumstances such as those in this case. 
The Commission's holding does not prevent willing 
adults from purchasing Carlin's record, from attending his 
performances, or, indeed, from reading the transcript 
reprinted as an appendix to the Court'e opinion. On its 
face, it does not prevent respondent from broadcasting the 
monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are 
likely to be in the audience, nor from broadcasting 
discussions of the contemporary use of language at any time 
during the day. The Commission's holding, and certainly 
the Court's holding today, does not speak to cases 
invol.ving the isolated use of a potentially offensive word 
in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from 
fthe verbal shock treatment administered by respondent 
here. In short, I agree that on the facts of this case, 
the Commission's order did not violate respondent's First 
Amendment rights. 
II 
As the foregoing demonstrates, my views are 
generally in accord with what is said in part IV(c) of MR. 
JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion. See ante, at 19-21. I therefore 
join that portion of his opinion. I do not join part 
IV(b), however, because I do not subscribe to the theory 
that the Justices of this Court are free generally to 
9 • 
decide on the basis of its content which speech protected 
by the First Amendment is most "valuable" and hence 
deserving of the most protection, and which is J.ess 
"valuable" and hence deserving of less protection. Compare 
ante, at 15-18; Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 
50, 63-73 (197G) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), with id., at 73 
n.l (POWELL, J., concurring) .ll In my view, the result 
in this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue, 
viewed as a whole, or the words that comprise it, have more 
or less "value" than a candidate's campaign speech. This 
is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the 
. d . h' 4/ JU ges to 1mpose upon 1m.~ 
The result turns instead on the unique 
characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with 
society's right to protect its children from speech 
generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years, and 
with the interest of unwilling adults in not being 
assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes. 
Moreover, I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any 
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's 
own words from doing so, and from making for himself a 
value judgment as to the merit of the message and words. 
Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 u.s., at 77-79 
(POWELL, J., concurring). These are the grounds upon which 




1. See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughtful 
opinion in the Court of Appeals. ___ U.S. App., at 
, 556 F. 2d, at 32-35 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). 
, 
2. It is true that the radio listener quickly may 
tune out speech that is offensive to him. In addition, 
broadcasters may preface programs with warnings as to their 
content. But such warnings do not help the unsuspecting 
listener who tunes in at the middle of a program. In this 
respect, too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and 
records, which may carry warnings on their faces, and from 
motion pictures and live performances, which may carry 
warnings on their marquees. 
3. The Court has, however, created a limited 
exception to this rule in order to bring commercial speech 
within the protection of the First Amendment. See Ohralik 
v. Ohio State Bar Association, u.s. (1978). 
4. For much the same reason, I also do not join 
part IV(a). I had not thought that the application vel non 
of overbreadth analysis should depend on the Court's 
judgment as to the value of protected speech that might be 
deterred. See ante, at 14-15. Except in the context of 
commercial speech, see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
u.s. 350, 380-38) (1977), it has not in the past. See, 
FN-2 
~, Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. 
Wilson, 405 u.s. 518 (1972). 
As MR. JUSTICE STEVENS points out, however, ante, 
at 6, the Commission's order was limited to the facts of 
this case; "it did not purport to engage in formal 
rulemaking or in the promulgation of any regulations." In 
addition, since the Commission may be expected to proceed 
cautiously, as it has in the past, cf. Brief for Petitioner 
42-43, I do not foresee an undue "chilling" effect on 
broadcasters' exercise of their rights. I agree, 
therefore, that respondent's overbreadth challenge is 
meritless. 
CHAI'-4BERS OF 
;%;u:prttttt <!faurt cf tfrt 'Jt!nitt~ ~tattg 
~aafringtcn.l§. <!f. 2LTgtJ1.~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE June 26, 1978 
Re: 77-528 - FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 
Dear Potter, 
Please join me in your dissenting 
opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 26 , 1978 
Re: No. 77-528 - FCC v. Pacifica 
Dear Potter : 
Please join rre . 
Sincerely, 
T. M. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
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Re: No. 77-528 ~ FCC v. Pacifica 
Dear Bill: 
Please join ~. 
Mr. Justice Brenmm 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
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June 26, 1978 / 
RE: No. 77-528 F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your dissent. My own was 
circulated on Saturday. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
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June 26, 1978 
Re: No. 77-528 - FCC v. Pacifica Foundation 
Dear Lewis: 
Writings of late, particularly in the dissent, demon-
strate once again that we are at the end of a term. I am 
convinced that things would not be so strident if the present 
circulations were making their rounds in October or November. 
This is just to advise you that your proposed changes 
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No doubt you have read 
which he pays his "respects" to 
C'ourt 's opi.nion. ·"~ , • , 
~ilJ Brennan's dis~ent in 
my: dissent as well as the 
•\, ,, 
Perhaps you will not wiEh to be associated with 
an opinion said to display "acute ethnocentric myopia," 
sad insensitivity", and "a naive innocence of reality". 
Assuming, however, your constancy, I enclose a 
marked up copy of a second draft of my opinion. In 
addition to the two changes you suggested, and the 
~. 
), 
add5tion of note 4 (that you have seen), I have made a few . 
minor edjting changes. If these meet with your approval, J;· 
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Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 77-528 
Federal Communications Com-~ On Writ of Certiorari to the 
mission, Petitioner, United States Court of Ap· 
v. peals for the District of 
Pacifica Foundation. Columbia Circuit. 
[June - , 1978] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN 
joins, concurring. 
I join Parts I, II, III, and IV(C) of MR. JusTICE STEVENS' 
opinion. The Court today reviews only the Commission's 
holding that Carlin's monologue was indecent "as broa:dcast0 
at two o'clock in the afternoon , and not the broad sweep of 
the Commission's opinion. Ante, at 6. In addition to being 
consistent with our settled practice of not deciding constitu-
tional issues unnecessarily, see ante, at 6; Ash wander v. Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J. , concurring) , this narrow focus also is conducive to the 
orderly development of this relatively new and difficult area 
of law, in the first instance by the Commission, 11nq then by 
the reviewing courts. See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, -
U. S. App. D. C.-, - - - , 556 F . 2d 9, 35-37 (1977) 
(Leventhal, J., dissenting) . 
I also a.gree with much that is said in Pa.rt IV of MR. JusTICE 
STEVENS' opinion , 1111d with its conclusion that the Commis-
si011 's holding in this case does not violate the First Amend-
ment. Because I do not subscribe to all that is said in Part· 
IV, however, I state my views separately. 
I 
It is conceded that the monologue at issue here is not 
obscene in the constitutional sense. See 56 F . C. C. 2d 94, 
.. 
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.- (1975); Brief for Petitioner 18. Nor, in this context, does 
its language constitute "fighting words" within the meaning of 
'Chapli:nsky v. Ne'IJ) Hampshire, ·315 U. S. 568 (1942). Some 
of the words used have been held protected by the First 
. Amendment in other cases and contexts. E. g., Lewis v. New 
Orleans, 415 U. S . . 130 (1974); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U. S. 105 
(1973); Papish v. University of Missouri, 410 U. S. 667 
(1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971); see also 
Eaton v. City of .Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974). I do not think 
Carlin, consistently with the First Amendment, could be 
punished for delivering the same monologue to a live audience 
composed of adults who. knowing what to expect, chose to 
attend his performance. See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U. S. 
914 ( 1972) (PowELL, J., concurring in result). And I would 
assume that an adult could not constitutionally be prohibited 
from purchasing . a. recording or transcript of the monologue 
and playing or reading it in the privacy ofhis own home. Cf. 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). . 
But it also is true that the language employed is, to most 
people. vulgar and offensive. ·- rt was chosen specifically f<>r 
this quality, and it was repeated over and over as a sort of 
verbal shock treatment. · The Commission did not err in char-
acterizing the narrow category of language used here as 
11patently offensive" to most people regardless of age. 
The issue, however, is whether the Commission may impose 
civil sanctions on a licensee radio station for broadcasting the 
monologue at two o'clock in the after. The Commission's 
primary concern was to prevent the broadcast from reaching 
the ears of unsupervised children who were likely to be in the 
audience at that hour. In essence, the Commission sought to 
11channel" ' the monologue to hours when the fewest unsuper-
vised children would be exposed to it. See 56 F. C. C. 2d, 
at - . In my view, this consideration provides strong sup-
port for the Commission's holding.1 
l See generally Judge Leventhal's thoughiful opinion in the Court of 
·'" 
·' . ' 
,, 
,, 
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The Court has recognized society's right to "adopt more 
stringent controls on commuuicative materials available to 
youths than on those available to adults." Erznoznik v. City 
of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 212 (1975); see also, e. g., 
Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 36 n. 17 (1973); Ginsberg 
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,636-643 (1968); Jacobellisv. Ohio, 
378 U. S. 184, 195 (Hl63) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). This 
recognition stems in large part from the fact that "a child ... 
is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice 
which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 650-651 (1968) (STE.WART, 
J., concurring in result). ·Thus, children may not be able to 
protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to 
most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling 
through the exercise of choice. At the same time, such speech 
may have a deeper and more lasting negative effect on a child 
than an adult. For these reasons, society m~y prevent tl!e 
general dissemination of such speech to children, lea.ving to 
parents the decision as to what speech of this kind their 
·ehildren shall hear and repeat : 
"[C] onstitutional interpretation has consistently recog-
nized that the parents' claim to authority in their own 
household to direct. the rearing of their children is basic 
in the structure of our society. 'It is cardinal with us 
that the custody, care, and nurture of th~ child reside 
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor hinder.' · Prince v. Massachusetts, [321 U. S. 
158, 166 ( 1944)]. The legislature could properly con-
clude that parents and others, teachers for example, who 
have this primary responsibility for children's well~being · 
are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid dis-







FCC v. PACIFICA fOUNDATION 
charge of that responsib'ility/' Ginsberg v. New Y ark~ 
S'Upra, at 639. 
The Commission properly held that the speech from which 
society may attempt to shield its children is not limited to 
that which appeals to the youthful prurient interest. · The 
language involved in this case is as potentially degrading and 
harmful to childrE-n as representations of many erotic acts. 
In most instances, the dissemination of this kind of speech 
to children 'may be limited without also· limiting willing 
adults' access to it. Sellers of printed and recorded matter 
and exhibitors of motion pictures and live performances may 
be required to shut their doors to children. but such a require-
ment has no effect on adults' access. See Ginsberg v. New 
York, mpra, at 634-635. The difficulty is that such a physical 
separation of the audience cannot be accomplished in the 
broadcast media. During most of the broadcast hours, both 
adults and unsupervised children are likely to be in the broad-
cast audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing adults 
without also reaching children. This. as the Court empha-
sizes, is one of the distinctions between the broadcast and 
other media to which we often have adverted as justifying 
a different treatment of the broadcast media for First Amend-· 
ment purposes. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 
350, 384 ( 1977) ; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 101 (1973); 
Red Linn Broadcastiny Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 386-387 
( 1969); Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 
582 (DC 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. 
Acting Attorney General, 405 U. S. 1000 ( 1972); see generally 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503 (1952). 
In my view. the Commission was entitled to give substantial 
weight to this differE-nce in reaching its decision in this case. 
A second difference. not without relevance, is that broad-
casting-unlike most. other forms of communication-comes 
directly into the home, the one place where people ordinarily 
77-528-CONCUR 
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have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive 
sights and sounds. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 
U. S. :205, 209 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 21 
(1971); Rowen v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 (1970). 
Although the First Amendment may require unwilling adults 
to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech when 
they are in publicc before they turn away, see, e. g., Erznoznik, 
s'ttpra, at 210-211, but cf. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U. S. 
901, 903-909 ( 1972) (PowELL, J., dissenting), a different order 
of values obtains in the home. "That we are often 'captives' 
outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objection~ 
able speech and other sou11d does not mean we must be cap-
tives everywhere." Rowan v. Post Office Dept., supra, at 738. 
The Commission also was entitled to give this factor appro-
priate weight in the circumstances of the instant case. This 
is not to say. however, that the Commission has an unre~ 
stricted license t.o decide what speech, protected in other 
media, may be banned from the airwaves in order to protect 
unwilling adults from momentary exposure to it in their 
homes.2 Making the sensitive judgments required in these 
cases is not easy. But this responsibility has been reposed 
initially in the Commission, and its judgment is entitled to 
respect. 
It is argued that rlcspite society's right to protect its children 
from this kind of speech, and despite everyone's interest in not 
being assaulted by offensive speech in the home, the Commis-
-sion's holding in this case is impermissible because it prevents 
willing adults from listening to Carlin's monologue over the 
radio in the early afternoon hours. It is said that this ruling 
2 It is true that the radio listener ~Iuickly may tune out speech that is 
offensive to him, In addition, broadca~ter~ may preface programs with 
warnings as to their content. l3ut ~uch warnings do not help the unsus- · 
pecting listener who tunes in at the middle of a program. In this respect, 
too, broadcasting appears to differ from books and records, which may 
carry warning;; on thPJr faces, and from motion pictures and live per-
formances, which may carry warnings on their marquees 
77-528-CONCUR 
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will have the effect of "reduc[ing] the adult population ... 
to [hearing] only what is fit for children." Butler v. Michi~ 
gan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). This argument is not without 
force. The Commission certainly should consider it as it 
develops standards in this area. But it is not sufficiently 
strong to leave the Commission powerless to act · in circum:-
stances such as those in thi~ case. 
The Commi$sion's holding does not prevent willing adults 
from purchasing Catlin's record, from attending his perform~ 
· ances, or, indeed, from rel'\qing the transcript reprinted as an 
appendix ·to the Court's opinion. On its face, it does not pre..-
vent respondent from broaclcasting the monologue during late 
evening hours when ·fewer children are likely to · be in the 
audience, nor from broadcasting discu!:lsions of the contem-
porary use of laqguage at any time during the day. ·The Com-
mission's holding, and certainly the Court's holding today, 
does not speak to CllSes involving the isolated use of a poten-
tially offensive word in the course of a radio broadcast, as 
distinguished from the verbal shock treatment administered 
by respondent here. In short, I ~ree that on the facts of 
this case, the Commission's order did not violate respondent's 
F~rst Amendment rights. 
II 
As the foregoing demonstrates, my views are generally in 
accord with what is said in Part IV (C) of MR. JusTICE 
SrrEVENs' opinion. See ante, at 19-21. I therefore join that 
portion of his opinion. I do not join Part IV (B) , however, 
because I do not subs01;il:~e to the theory that the Justices of 
this Court are free generally to decide on the basis of its con-
tent which speech protected by the First Amendment is most 
" valuable'' and hence deserving of the most protection, and 
I 
wpich is less "valuable1' {lnd hence deserving of less protec-
tion . Compare ante, at 15-18; Young v. American Mini 
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with id., at 73 n. 1 (PowELL, J., concurring). 3 In my view, 
the result in this case does not turn on whether Carlin's mono-
logue, viewed as a whole, or the words that comprise it, have 
more or less "val11e" than a candidate's campaign speech. 
This is a judgment for each person to make, not one for the 
judges to impose upon him.• 
The result turr~s instead on the unique characteristics of the 
broadcast media. combined with society's rjght to protect its 
children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for 
their years, and with the interest of unwilling adults in not 
being assaulted by such offensive speech in their homes. 
Moreover, I doubt wlwther today's decision will prevent any 
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's own 
words from doing so, and from making for himself a value 
judgment as to the merit of the message and words. Cf. 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S .. at 77-79 
(PowELL, J., concurring). "These are the grounds upon which 
I join the judgment of the Court as to Part IV. 
3 The Court has, however, created a limited exception to this rule in 
order to bring commercial speech within the protection of the First Amend-
ment . See OhraLik v. Ohio State Bar Association, - U. S. -, -
(1978). 
4 For mnch the same reason, I also do not join Part IV (a). I had not 
thought that the application vel non of overbreadth analysis should depend 
on the Court's judgment as to the value of the protected speech that might 
be deterred. See ante, at 14-15. Except in the context of commercial 
speech, sec Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 380--381 (1977), 
it has not in the past . See, e. g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S. 1'30 
(1974) ; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972) . 
As Mn .• Tm;1'ICE STEVENS points out, however, ante, at 6, Commission's 
order was limited to the facts of this case; "it did not purport to engage 
in formal rulemaking or in the promulgAtion of any regulations." In addi-
tion, since the Commission may be expected to proceed cautiously, as it 
has in the past, cf. Brief for Petitioner 42-43, I do not foresee an undue 
"chilling" effect on broadcasters' exercise of their rights . I ngree, there-
fore, thut respondent 's overbreadth rhallenge is meritless. 
To: The Chief Just1c~ 
Mr. Justice StPW? , 
Mr. Justice W ~JJ 
Mr. Justice V~R 1 V"' 
Mr. Jup-'- , ' 1 " 1 
Mr. Jusr.,ie/r T' 'l_l ~ _) 
Mr. Ju& t ~ > ' ~t 
Mr. JU"' ) AC~o r 'llS 
From: Mr. JF ~:~T 
Circulat"~d )tv~!~· _ 
ti r( ? ~ ~ •r ~ -
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATJi.1.t "~ ~ 





On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. 
[June -, 19.78] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
I agree with MR. JusTICE STEWAR'l' that, under Hamling v.. 
United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), and United States v. 12 
200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973), the word 11inde-
cent" in 18 U. S. C. § 1464 must be construed to prohibit only 
obscene speech. I would, therefore, normally refrain from 
expressing my views on any constitutional issues implicated 
in this case. However, I find the Court's misapplication of 
fundamental First Amendment principles so pa.tent, and its 
attempt to impose its sadly myopic notions of propriety on 
the wJtole of the American people so misguided, that I am 
unable to remain silent. 
I 
For the second time in two years, see Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, 427 U. S. 50 (1976), the Court refuses to 
embrace the notion, completely antithetical to basic First 
Amendment values, that the degree of protection the First 
Amendment affords protected speech varies with the social 
value ascribed to that speech by five Members of this Court. 
See opinion of MR. JuSTICE PowELL, ante, at-. Moreover, 
as do all parties, all Members of the Court agree that the 
Carlin monologue aired by Station WBAI does not fall within 
one of the categories of speech, such as "fighting words," 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), or 
obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 ( 1957), that 
' 
,, 
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is totally without First Amendment protection. This conclu-
sion, of course, is compelled by our cases expressly holding 
that communications containing some of the words found 
sanctionable here are fully protected by the First Amendment 
in other contexts. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U. S. 697 
· (1974); Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U. S. 
667 (1973); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis 
v. New Orleans, 408 U. S. 913 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New 
· Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 
(1971). Yet despite the Court's refusal to create a sliding 
scale of First Amendment protection calibrated to this Court's 
perception of the worth of a communication's content, and 
despite our unanimous agreement that the Carlin monologue 
is protected speech, a majority of the CoQrt 1 nevertheless 
finds tha.t, on the facts of this case, the FCC is not constitu-
tionally barred from imposing sanctions on Pacificf.L for its 
airing of the Carlin monologue. This majority apparently 
believes that the FCC's disapproval of Pacifica's afternoon 
broadcast of Carlin's "Dirty Words"' recording is a permissible 
time, place, a.nd manner regulation. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U. S. 77 (1949). Both the opinion of my Brother STEVENS 
and the opinion of my Brother PowELL rely principally on 
two factors in reaching this conclusion: (1) the capacity of a 
r~:~.dio broadcast to intrude into the unwilling listener's home,· 
and (2) the presence of children in the listening audience. 
Dispassionate analysis, removed from individual notions as 
to what is proper and what is not, starkly rev~als that these 
justifications, whether individually or together. simply do not 
support even the professedly moderate degree of governmental 
homogenization of radio communications-if, indeed, such 
homogenization can ever be moderate given the pre-eminent 
1 Where I critically refer undifferentiatingly to t.hc actions of "the 
Court," my refen•nce is to this majority, which consists of my Brothers 
PowELL and STEVENS and those Merpbers of the Court joining their 
separate opinions. 
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status of the right of free speech 111 our constitutional 
scheme-that the Court today permits. 
A 
Without question, the privacy interests of an individual 
in his home are substantial and deserving of significant pro-
tection. In finding these interests sufficient to justify the 
content regulation of protected speech, however, the Court 
commits two errors. First. it misconceives the na.ture of the 
privacy interests involved where an individual voluntarily 
chooses to admit radio communications into his home. 
Second, it ignores the constitutionally protected interests of 
both those who wish to transmit and those who desire to 
receive broadcasts that many-induding the FCC ancl' this 
Court-might find offensive. 
"The ability of government, conso11ant with the Constitu-
tion, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing-
it is ... dependent upon a showing that substantial priVItCY 
interests are being invaded· in an essentially intolerable man-
ner. Any broader view of this authority would. effectively· 
empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter 
of personal predilections." Cohen v. California, supra, at tl. 
I am in wholehearted agreement with my brethren that all 
individual's right "to be let alone" when engaged in private 
activity within the confines of his own home is encompassed 
within the "substantial privacy interests" to which Mr. Justice 
Harian referred in Cohen, and is entitled to the greatest 
solicitude. Stanley v. Georgia., 394 U. S. 557 (1969·). How-
ever, I believe that an individual's actions in switching on 
and listening to communications transmitted over the publiC'. 
airways and directed to the public at-large does not implicate 
fundamental privacy interests, even when engaged in within 
the home. Instead, because the radio is undeniably a publie 
medium, these actions are more properly viewed .as a decision 
to take part, if oniy as a. listener, in an ongoing public dis-
. . 
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course. See Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the Firs~ 
Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 Va. L. Rev. 
579, 618 (19'75). Although an individual's decision to allow 
public radio communications into his home undoubtedly does 
not abroga.te all of his privacy interests, the residual privacy 
interests he retains vis-a-vis the communication he volun-
tarily admits into his home are surely no greater than those 
of the peo 1e present in the corridor of the Los An eles court-
house in o en w o ore witness to the words "Fuck the 
1'5'iil't" emblazoned across Cohen's jacket. . Their privacy 
interests were held insufficient to justify punishing CoheJl for 
his offensive communication. 
Even if an individual who voluntarily opens his home to 
radio communications retains privacy interests of sufficient 
moment to justify a ban on protected speech if those interests 
are "invaded in an essentially intolerable manner," Cohen v. 
California, supra, at 21, the very fact that those interests are 
threatened only by a radio broadcast of itself precludes the 
latter condition from being satisfied; for unlike other intru-
sive modes of communication, such as sound trucks, "[t]he 
radio can be turnep off," Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 
418 U. S. 298, 302 (1974)-and with a minimum of effort. 
As Judge Bazelon a.ptly observed below, "having elected to 
receive public air waves, the scanner who stumbles onto an 
offensive program is in the same position as the unsuspecting 
passers-by in Cohen and Erznoznik [v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U. S. 205 ( 1975)]; he can avert his attention by changing 
channels or turning otf the set." Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 
- U. S. App. D. C.-, 556 F. 2d 9, 26 (1977). Whatever 
the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who inadvert-
ently tunes into a program he fipds offensive during the brief 
interval before he can simply extend his arm ancl. switch sta-
tions or flick the "off" button. it is surely worth the candle 
to preserve the broadcaster's right to send, and the right of 
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Amendment protection. 'ro reach a contra.ry balance, as 
does the Court, is clearly, to follow MR. JusTICE STEVENS' 
reliance on animal metaphors, ante, at 21, "to burn the house 
to roast the pig." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 
(1957) . 
The Court's balance, of necessity, fails to a.ccord proper 
weight to the interests of listeners who wish to h~ar broad~ 
casts the FCC deems offensive. It permits majoritarian tastes 
completely to preclude a protected message from entering the 
homes of a receptive, unoffended minority. No decision of 
this Court supports such a result. Where the individuals 
comprising the offended majority may freely choose to reject 
the materia.l being offered, we have never found their privacy 
interests of such moment to warrant the suppression of speech 
on privacy grounds. Compare Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights, supra. Rowan v. Post Office Department, 3~7 U.S. 
728 ( 1970) , relied on by the FCC and by the opinions of my 
Brothers PowELL and S'I'EVENS, confirms rather than belies 
this conclusion. In Rowan, the Court upheld a statute, 39 
U. S. C. § 4009, permitting householders to require that mail 
advertisers stop sending them lewd or offensive materials 
and remove their names from mailing lists. Unlike the situa~ 
tion here, householders who wished to receive the sender's 
communications were not prevented from doing so. Equal-ly 
important, the determination of offensiveness Vf!l rton under 
the statute involved i:p Rowan was completely within the 
hands of the individual householder; no governmental evalua-
tion of the worth of the mail's content stood between the 
mailer and the househplder. In contrast, the visage of the 
censor is all too discernable here. 
B 
Most parents will undoubtedly find understandable as well 
as commendable the Court's sympathy with the FCC's desire 
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unsupervised children. Unfortunately, the facial appeal of 
this justification for radio censorship masks its constitutional 
insufficiency. Although the government unquestionably has 
a special interest in the well-being of children and conse-
quently "can adopt more stringent controls on communicative 
materials available to youths than on those available to 
adults." Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 212, see 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-107 (1973) 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting), the Court has accounted for this 
societal interest by adopting a "variable obscenity" standard 
that permits the prurient appeal of material available to chil-
dren to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of minors. 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). It is true that 
the obscenity standard the Ginsberg Court adapted for such 
materials was based on the then-applicable obscenity standard 
of R,oth v. United States, supra, and Memoirs v. k(assachus-
setts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966), and that "[w]e have not had 
occasion to decide what effect Miller [v. California, 413 
U. S. 15 (1973)] will have on the Ginsberg formulation." 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 213 n. 10. Never-
theless, we have made it abundantly clear that "under any test 
of obscenity as to minors ... to be obscene 'such expression 
must be, in some significant wa.y, erotic.' Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15,20 (1971)." Ibid. 
Because the Carlin monologue is obviously not an erotic 
appeal to the prurient interests of children, the Court, for the 
first time, allows the government to prevent minors from 
gaining access to materials that are not obscene, and are there-
fore protected, as to them. 2 It thus ignores our recent admoni-
tion that "[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths nor. 
subject to some other legitima.te pros~ription cannot be sup-
2 Even if the monologue appealed to the prurient interest of minor~, 
it would not. be ob::<~ne as to them unless, as to them, "the work, taken 
ns a whole, lack~ serious literary, artistic, po]itical, or scientific value:" 
Miller v. f'alifornia,. 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973). 
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pressed solely to protect the yollng from ideas or images that a 
legislative body thinks unsuitabl(;l for them." /d., at 213-214.:~ 
The Court's refusal to follow its own pronouncements i~ 
especially lamentable since it has the anomalous subsidiary 
effect, at least in the radio context at issue here, of making 
completely unavailable to adults material which may not 
constitutionally be kept even from children. This result vio-
lates the principle of Butler v. Michigan, 35~ U. S. 380 ( 1957), 
in spades. Butler involved a challenge to a. Michigan sta.tQte 
that forbade the publication, sale, or distribution of print~d 
material "tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or 
immoral acts, mimifestly tending to the corruption of the 
morals of youth." 1d., at 381. Although Roth v. United 
States, supra, had not yet been decided, it is at least arguable 
that the material the statute in Butler was designed to suppress 
constitutionally could have been. denied to children. Never-
theless, this Court found the statute unconstitutional. Speak-
ing for the Court, Mr. Justice Fra.nkfurter reasoned: 
"The incidence of this ena.ctment is to reduce the adult 
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for 
children. It thereby arbitra.rily curtails one of those 
liberties of the individual, now enshrined in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that history 
has attested as the indispensable conditions for the main-
tenance and progress of a free society." Butler v. 
Michigan, supra, at 383-384. 
3 It may well be that. a narrowly drawn regulation prohibiting the use 
of offensive language on broaqcasts directed specifically at. younger chil-
dren constitutes one of the "other legitimate proscription[s]" aJ!uded to 
in Erznoznik. This is so both because of the difficulties· inherent. in 
adapting the Miller formulatiqn to communications received by young 
children, and because such childr.en are "not possessed of that full capacity 
Ior individual choice which is the presupposition of the First Amendment 
·guarantees." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 649-650 (1968) 
(S·r~w .-\R'l', ,T., concurring). 
f. 
':; 
1, ; •.. 
.. , r 
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Where, as here, the goverument may not prevent the exposure 
of minors to the suppressed material, the principle of Butler 
applies a fortiori. The opinion of my Brother POWELL 
acknowledges that there lurks in today's decision a potential 
for f( 'reduc[ing] the adult population . .. to :[hearing] 011ly 
what is fit for children,'" ante, at-, but expresses faith that 
the FCC will vigilantly prevent this potential from ever 
becoming a reality. I am f11.r less certain than my Brother 
PowELL that such faith in the Commission is warranted, see 
Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F. 2d 
397, 418-421 (statement of Bazelon, C. J., as to why he voted 
to grant rehearing en bane); and even if I shared it, I could 
not so easily shirk the responsibility assumed by each Member 
of this Court with the donning of his robes jealously to guard 
against encroachments on First Amendment freedoms. 
In concluding that the presence of children in the listening 
audience provides an adequate basis for the FCC to sanction 
Pacifica's broadcast of the Carlin monologue over radio, the 
opinions of my Brother PowELL, ante, at -, and my Brother 
STEVENS, ante, at 20, both stress the time-honored right of a 
parent to raise his child as he sees fit-a right this Court has 
consistently been vigilant to protect. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
( 1925). Yet this principle supports a result directly contrary 
to that reached by the Court. Yoder and Pierce hold that 
pa.rents, not the government, haye the right to make certain 
decisions regarding the upbringing of their children. · As sur-
prising as it may be to individual Members of this Court, some 
pa,.rents may actually find Mr. Carlin's unabashed attitude 
towards the. seven "dirty words" healthy, and deem it desirable 
to expose their children to the manner in which Mr. Ca.rlin 
defuses the taboo surrounding the words. Such parents may 
constitute a minority of the American public, but the absence 
·of great numbers willing to exercise the right to raise their 
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children in this fashion does not alter the right's nature or its 
existence. Only the Court's regrettable decision does that:' 
c 
As demonstrated above, neither of the factors relied on by 
both the opinion of my Brother PowELL and the opinion of 
my }3rother STEVENs-the intrusive nature of radio and the 
presence of children in the listening audience-can, when taken 
on its own terms, support the FCC's disapproval of the Carlin 
monologue. These two asserted justifica.tions are further 
plagued by a common failing: the lac-k of principled limits on 
their use as a bl'l-sis for FCC censorship. No such limits come 
readily to mind, and neither of the opinions comprising the 
Court serve to clarify the extent to which the FCC may assert 
the privacy and children-in-the-audience rationales as justifi-
cation for expunging from the airways protected communica-
tions the Commission finds offensive. Taken to their logical 
extreme, these rationales would support the cleansing of public 
radio of any "four-letter" words whatsoever, regardless of their 
context. The rationales could justify the banning from radio 
of a myriad of literary works, novels, poems, and plays by the 
likes of Shakespeare, Joyce, Hemingway, Ben Jonson. Henry 
Fielding, Robert Burns, and Chaucer; they could support the 
suppression of a good deal of political speech, such as the 
Nixon tapes; and they could even provide the basis for im-
posing sanctions for the broadcast of certain portions of the 
Bible .~ 
4 The opinions of my Brothers PowELL and STEVENS rightly refrain 
from rE-lying on the notion of "spectrum scarcity" to support their result. 
As Chief Judge Ba.zelon noted below, "although scarc.ity has justified 
increasing the divE-rsity of speakers and spE-ech, it has never been held to 
justify cen::;orship." 556 F . 2d, at. 29 (emphasis in original) . See Red 
Lion Broadrasting Co. Y. FCC. 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969). 
~ seE', e g., I Samuel 52:22: "So and more also do God unto the ene{llies 
of David, tf I lea.ve of all that. pertHin to him be the morning light any 
1.ha.t pi~seth against the wall." ; 11 King:> 18:27 and Isaiah 36:12 : "[H]ath 
}. 
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In order to dispel the spectre of the possibility of so un-
palatable a degree of censorship. and to defuse Pacifica's over-
breadth challenge, the FCC insists that it desires only the 
authority to reprimand a broadcaster on facts an~tlogous to 
those present in this case, which it describes as involving 
"broadcasting for nearly twelve minutes a record which re-
peated over and over words which depict sexual or excretory 
activities and organs in a manner patently offensive by its 
community's contemporary standards in the ea.rly afternoon 
when children were in the audience." Brief for the Federal 
Communcations Commission 45. The opillions of both my 
Brother PowELL and my Brother STEVENS take the FCC at 
its word, and consequently do no more than permit the Com-
mission to censor the afternoon broadcast of the "sort of lin-
guistic shock treatment," opinion of MR. JusTICE PowELL, 
ante, at -, involved here. To insure that the FCC's regu- . 
lation of protected speech does not exceed these bounds, my 
Brother PowELL is content to rely upon the judgment of the 
Commission while my Brother STEVENS deems it prudent to 
rely on this Court's ability accurately to assess the worth of 
various kinds of speech.° For my own part, even accepting 
he not ~ent me to thr mrn whirh ~it on t.hr wall, that they may eat their 
own dung, and drink their own piRio' with you?"; Ezekiel 23:3: "And 
t.hey committed whoredoms in Egrpt; the committed whorrdoms in their 
youth ; there were thrir brem;tf' prcssrd. and t.here tlwy bruised the teats 
of their virginity."; Ezekiel 2~ :21: "Thus tho calledst. to remembrance 
the lewdnes of they youth in hrui~ing they trats by the Egyptians for the 
pa.ps of thy yout.h." The Biblr (King Jame~; Version). 
6 Although ultimately dependrnt. upon the outcome of review in this 
Court, the approach taken by my Brother S·rEVENs would not appea.r to 
tolerate the FCC's supprrR~ion of any :>prcch, such as political speech, 
falling within t.hr corr area of First Amrndmcnt concern. The same, 
however, cannot be said of thr approach taken by my Brother PowELL, 
which, on its face, permits thr Commission to censor even political speech . 
i~ it is sufficiently offensive to eommunity standards. A result more con-· 
'tra.ry to rudimentary First. Amendment principle~ i::; difficult to imagine. 
•. 
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that this case is limited to its facts.' I would place the re-
sponsibility and the right to weed worthless and offensive 
communications from the public airways where it belongs and 
where. until today, it resided; in a public free to choose those 
communications worthy of its attention from a marketplace 
unsullied by the censor's hand. 
II 
The absence of any hesitancy in the opinions of my Brothers 
POWELL and STEVENS to approve the FCC's censorship of the 
Carlin monologue on the basis of two demonstrably inadequate 
grounds is a function of their perception that the decision will 
result in little, if any, curtailment of communicative exchanges 
protected by the First Amendment. Although the extent to 
which the Court stands ready to countenl:\nce FCC censorship 
of protected speech is unclear from today's decision, I find the 
:r_:easoning by which my Brethren conclude that the FCC 
censorstip they approve will not significantly infringe on First 
Amendment values l~_£_!h
1
disingenuoutas to reality ll!ld wrong 
as a matter of law. 
My Brother STEVENS. in reaching a result apologetically 
described as narrow, ante, at 21, takes comfort in Eis observa-
tion that "[a] requirement that indecent language be avoided 
7 Having insist«! that. it seeks to S<tnction radio communications only 
in the limited circumstances present here, I bl'lieve that the FCC is 
estopped from using either this decision or its own orders in this case, 
56 F. C. C. 2d 94 (1975), and 59 F. C. C. 2d 892 (1967) , as a basis for 
sanctioning nny public ra.dio bro11.dcru:t other than one aired during the 
daytime or early evening and containing the relentletl$ repetition, for 
longer than a. brief interval, of "languuge that describes, in terms patently 
offensive as me11sured by contemporary community standards for the 
bro11dcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs." 56 F. C. C. 
2d, at 98. For surely broadca~;ters are not now on notice that. the Com-
mission desires to regulate any offen;;ive broadcast , other than the type of 
"linguistic shock treatment" condemned here, at any time, or even this 
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will have its primary effect on the form, rather than the con-
tent, of serious communicatiou,' ' ante, at 14 n. 18, and finds 
solace in his conviction that "[t]here are few, if any, thoughts 
tliiif'cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." 
Ibid. The idea that the content of a message and its potential 
impact on any who might receive it can be divorced from the 
words that are the vehicle for its expression is transpa.rently 
fallacious. A given word ma.y have a unique capa.city to 
capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an image. 
Indeed, for those of us who pi~ an ap}~iately high.__v~e 
on our cherished First Amendment righ ts. the word "censor" 
is such a word. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, 
recognized the truism that a speaker's choice of words cannot 
surgically be separated from the ideas he desires to express 
when he warned that "we cannot iudulge the facile assump-
tion that one can forbid particular words without also running 
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." Cohen 
v. California, supra, at 26. Moreover. even if a.n alternative 
phrasing may communica.te a speaker's abstract ideas as ef-
fectively as those words he is forbidden to use. it is doubtful 
that the stcrlized message will convey the emotion that is an 
essential part of so many conmlUnications. This. too, was 
apparent to Mr. Justice Harlan and the Court i11 Cohen. 
"[W]e cannot overlook the fact. because it is well illus-
trated by the episode involved here. tha.t much linguistic 
expression serves a dual communicative function: it con-
veys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached 
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. 
In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive 
as their cognitive force. We cannot sallction the view 
that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive 
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for 
that emotive function which. practically speaking, may 
often be the more important element of the overall mes-
sage sought to be communica,ted." !d., at 25-26. 
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My Brother STEVENS also finds relevant to his First Amend-
ment analysis the fact that "[a]dults who feel the need may 
purchase tapes and records or go to theatres and nightclubs 
to hear [the tabooed] words." Ante, at 21 n. 27. My 
.Brother PowELL agrees: "The Commission's holding does not 
prevent willing adult8 from purchasing Carlin's record, from 
attending his performances, or. indeed. from reading the 
trranscript reprinted as an appendix to the Court's opinion." 
Ante, at -. The opinions of my Brethren display both a 
'' sad insens.itivityJo the fact that these alternatives involve 
the expenditure of money. time, and effort that many of those 
wishing the hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able to 
afford. and a ·;1aive innocence~'of the reality that in many 
cases, the medium may well be the message. 
The Court apparently believes that the FCC's actions here 
can be analogized to the zoning ordinances upheld in Young 
v. American Mini Theatres, supra. For two reasons, it is 
wrong. First. the zoning ordinances found to pass constitu-
tional muster in Young had valid goals other than the chan-
neling of protected speech. !d., at 71 n. 34 (opinion of 
STEVENS. J.); id., at 80 (PowELL, J.. concurring). No such 
goals are present here. Second, and crucial to the opinions 
of my Brothers PowELL and STEVENS in Young--opinions, 
which, as they do in this case, supply the ~re five-person 
majority of the Court-the ordinances did not restrict the 
a~ of distributors or exhibitors to the market or impair 
the viewing public's access to the regulated material. !d., at 
62, 71 11. 35 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 77 (POWELL, J., 
concurring). Again, this is not the situation here. Both 
those desiring to receive Carlin 's message over the radio and 
those wishing to send it to them are prevented from doing so 
by the Commission's actions. Although, as my Brethren 
}!>Oint out, Carlin's message may be disseminated or received 
by other means. this is of little consolation to those broad-
casters and listeners who, for a host of reasons, not least 
-. 
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among them financial. do not have access to, or cannot take 
advantage of, these other means. 
Moreover, it is doubtful that even those frustrated liseteners 
in a position to follow my Brother PowELL's gratuitous ad-
::.!£.e and attend one of Carlin's performances or purchase one 
of his records would receive precisely the same message Pa-
cifica's radio station sent its audience. The airways are cap-
' able not only of carrying a message, but also of transforming 
it. A satirist's monologue may be most potent when delivered 
to a live audience; yet the choice whether this will in fact 
be the manner in which the message is delivered and received 
is one the First Amendment prohibits the government from 
making. 
III 
It is quite evident that I find the Court's attempt to un-
stitch the warp and woof of First Amendment law in an effort 
to reshape its fabric to cover the patent!~ wrong result the 
Court reaches in this case d~tn~erous as well ,!S !!mentable. 
Yet there runs throughout t e opinions of my l1rothers 
PowELL and STEVENS another vein I find equally disturbing: a 
degtessing inabiljty to appre~ that in our land of cultural 
plura"mm, "there are many who think, act, ~nd talk differently 
from the Members of this Court, and who do not share their 
fragil~bilities. It is only an acute ethnocen'tric myopia 
I! K$1 .. -- -~a ~ - sr • 
that ena es the Court to approve me censorsiiip of commu-
nications solely because of the words they contain. 
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is 
the skin of a living thought and may va~y greatly in color 
and content according to the circumstances and the time in 
which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 4181 425 (1918) 
(Holmes, J.). The words that the Court and the Commis-
sion find so unpalatable may be the stuff of everyday conver-
sations in some, if not many. of the innumerable subcultures 
that comprise this Nation. Academic research indicates that 
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Water and Swim Like Me (1974); Dillard, Black English 
(1972); Labov, Language in the Inner City: Studies in the 
Black English Vernacular (1972). As one researcher con-
cluded, " [ w ]ords generally considered obscene like 'bullshit' 
and 'fuck' are considered neither obs·cene nor derogatory in the 
[black] vernacular e;xcept in pl;\rticuljlr contextual situations 
and when used with certain intonations." Bins, "Toward an 
Ethnography of Contemporary African American Oral Po-
etry," Language and Linguistics Working Papers No. 5 
(Georgetown University Press 1972). 
Today's decision will thus hltve its greatest impact on listen-
ing audiences comprised of persons who do not share the Court's 
view as to which words or !'lXpressiops are acceptable and who, 
for a variety of reasons, including l1 conscious desire to flout 
majoritarian conventions, express themselves using words tqat 
may be regarded as offensive by those from different socio-
economic b;:tckgrounds, and on broadcasters desiring to reach 
such audiences.8 In this context, the Court's decision may 
be seen for what, in the broader perspective, it really is: an-
other of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to force those 
groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of 
thinking, acting, and speaking. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, '· 506-511 (1977) ca~)<JNNAN, J., concurring). 
Pacifica, in response to an FCC inquiry about its broadcast 
of Carlin's satire on "the words you couldn't say on the public 
airwaves." explained that "Carlin is not mouthing obsceni-
ties, ~e is merely using words to satirize as harmless and essen-
tially silly our attitudes towards those words.'' 56 F. C. C. 
sUnder t.he approach taken by my Brother PowELL, the availability of 
br<;>adcasts about groups whose members comprit;e such audiences might 
also be affected, Both news broadcao;ts about. activities involving these 
groups and public affairs broadcat'ts about, their concerns are apt to cont11in 
interviews, statement<~, or remarks by group leaders and members which 
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' 2d, at -. In confirming Carlin's prescience as a. social com-
mentator by the result it reaches today, the Court evinces an 
attitude towards the "seven dirty words'' that many others 
besides Mr. Carlin and Pacifica might describe as "silly." 
Whether today's decision will similarly prove ''harmless" 
remains to be see. One ca.n only hope that it will. 
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